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We build on the Maddison GDP data to assemble international time series from before 1914 on real
per capita personal consumer expenditure, C. We also improve the GDP data in many cases. The C
variable comes closer than GDP to the consumption concept that enters into usual asset-pricing equations.
(A separation of consumer expenditure into durables and non-durables is feasible for only a minority
of cases.) We have essentially full annual data on C for 22 countries and GDP for 35 countries, and
we plan to complete the long-term time series for a few more countries. For samples that start as early
as 1870, we apply a peak-to-trough method for each country to isolate economic crises, defined as
cumulative declines in C or GDP by at least 10%. The principal world economic crises ranked by importance
are World War II, World War I and the Great Depression, the early 1920s (possibly reflecting the influenza
epidemic of 1918-20), and post-World War II events such as the Latin American debt crisis and the
Asian financial crisis. We find 87 crises for C and 148 for GDP, implying disaster probabilities around
3.6% per year. The disaster size has a mean of 21-22% and an average duration of 3.5 years. A comparison
of C and GDP declines shows roughly coincident timing. The average fractional decline in C exceeds
that in GDP during wartime crises but is similar for non-war crises. We simulate a Lucas-tree model
with i.i.d. growth shocks and Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences. This simulation accords with the observed
average equity premium of around 7% on levered equity, using a "reasonable" coefficient of relative
risk aversion of 3.5. This result is robust to a number of perturbations, except for limiting the sample
to non-war crises, a selection that eliminates most of the largest declines in C and GDP. We plan a
statistical analysis that uses all the time-series data and includes estimation of long-run effects of crises
on levels and growth rates of C and GDP. We will also study the bond-bill premium (empirically around
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jfursua@fas.harvard.edu  An earlier study (Barro [2006]) applied the Rietz (1988) insight on rare economic 
disasters to explain the equity-premium puzzle introduced by Mehra and Prescott (1985).  
Key parameters were the probability, p, of disaster and the distribution of disaster sizes, b. 
Because large macroeconomic disasters are rare, pinning down p and the b-distribution 
from historical data requires long time series for many countries, along with the 
assumption of rough parameter stability over time and across countries.  Barro (2006) 
relied on long-term international GDP data for 35 countries from Maddison (2003).  
Using the definition of an economic disaster as a peak-to-trough fall in per capita GDP by 
at least 15%, 60 disasters were found, corresponding to p=1.7% per year.  The average 
disaster size was 29%, and the empirical size distribution was used to calibrate a model of 
asset pricing. 
  The underlying asset-pricing theory relates to consumption, rather than GDP.  
This distinction is especially important for wars.  For example, in the United Kingdom 
during the two world wars, GDP increased while consumer expenditure fell sharply—the 
difference representing mostly added military spending.   
  Maddison (2003) provides national-accounts information only for GDP.  Our 
initial idea was to add consumption, which we approximate by real personal consumer 
expenditure, C, because of difficulties in most cases in separating durables from non-
durables in the long-term data.  (We discuss later the breakdown of C into durables 
versus non-durables for a sub-set of countries with available data for crisis periods.)  We 
have not assembled data on government consumption, some of which may substitute for 
C and, thereby, affect asset pricing.  However, this substitution is probably unimportant   2
for military expenditure, which is the type of government spending that moves a lot 
during some disaster events. 
  Maddison (2003), with updates available on the Internet at 
www.ggdc.net/maddison, represents a monumental and widely used resource for 
international studies using long-term GDP data.  However, although much of the 
information is sound, close examination revealed many problems.  For our purposes, the 
most important shortcoming is that Maddison tends to fill in missing data with doubtful 
assumptions, and this practice is most common for major crises.   
  As examples of problems, Maddison assumed that Belgium’s GDP during WWI 
and WWII moved with France’s; Mexico’s GDP between 1910 and 1919, the period 
including the Revolution and Civil War, followed a smooth trend (with no crisis); GDP 
for Colombia moved over more than a decade with the average of Brazil and Chile; and 
GDP in Germany for the crucial years 1944-46 followed a linear trend. There were also 
mismatches between original works and published series for GDP in Japan and Austria at 
the end of WWII, Greece during WWII and its Civil War, and South Korea during WWII 
and the Korean War.  
  Given these and analogous problems in other cases, our project expanded to 
estimating long-term GDP for many countries.  The Maddison information was often 
usable, but superior estimates or longer time series can often be constructed.  In addition, 
results from recent major long-term national-accounts projects for several countries are 
now available and have not been incorporated into Maddison’s Internet updates.  These 
studies cover Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Greece, Sweden, and Taiwan.  Appendix I 
summarizes the key differences, by country and time period, between Maddison’s and   3
our GDP data.  We will make details and a complete list of data sources available on the 
Internet. 
  The next section describes the long-term data that we have assembled on real per 
capita personal consumer expenditure, C, and GDP.  Our main analysis uses annual data 
from before 1914 for 22 countries on C and 35 countries on GDP.  Section II discusses 
the long-term data that we use on rates of return for stocks, bills, and bonds.  This 
information comes mostly from Global Financial Data.  Section III describes our 
measurement of C and GDP crises, based primarily on peak-to-trough fractional declines 
during the crises.  Section IV discusses the limited information available on the 
breakdown of consumer expenditure into durables versus non-durables and services.   
  Section V compares disaster sizes and timing based on consumer expenditure 
with that on GDP.  Section VI uses the crises data to measure disaster probabilities and 
frequency distributions of disaster sizes.  Section VII summarizes a representative-agent 
Lucas-tree model that relates disaster experience to expected rates of return and the 
equity premium.  Section VIII simulates the Lucas-tree model using the empirically 
estimated disaster probability and frequency distribution of disaster sizes.  The simulated 
model with a reasonable coefficient of relative risk aversion turns out to accord with 
observed equity premia.  Section IX modifies the simulation to use observed real stock-
price changes to gauge crisis returns on stocks.  We also discuss the low average of real 
bill returns observed during crises.  Section X concludes with plans for additional 
research. 
 
   4
I.  Long-term Data on Personal Consumer Expenditure and GDP 
    We are dealing with national-accounts data for 42 countries.  This sample is the 
universe of countries that seem to be promising for constructing reasonably accurate 
annual data since before World War I.  The current study focuses on the countries for 
which we have, thus far, assembled annual data from before 1914 to 2006 on real per 
capita personal consumer expenditure, C (22 countries), and real per capita GDP (35 
countries).
1  Henceforth, we sometimes refer to C as “consumption.”   
  Table 1 has a list of included countries and starting years.  Part 1 of the table 
applies to 21 “OECD countries” (not including Turkey or recent members)—17 of these 
are in our C sample, and all 21 are in our GDP sample.  Part 2 covers 18 non-OECD 
countries—only 5 of these are in our C sample, and 14 are in our GDP sample.  The three 
countries that we are studying that are omitted from Table 1 are Egypt, Ireland, and 
Russia.  We start our analysis of growth rates in 1870, although earlier data are available 
in some cases. 
  Most of our analysis uses growth rates of C and GDP and does not involve 
comparisons of levels across countries.  Therefore, for most purposes, we can use indexes 
of C and GDP; for example, setting the values of both variables to 100 for each country 
in 2000.  However, the level comparisons matter for the construction of measures of C 
and GDP for groups of countries, such as the total of the OECD.  To facilitate this 
analysis (and to allow for other uses of the data that depend on comparability of levels 
across countries), we set the level of per capita GDP for each country in 2000 to the PPP-
adjusted value in 2000 international dollars given in the World Bank’s World 
                                                 
1 GDP data are missing for Greece in 1944 and the Philippines in 1941-45, but we are able to include these 
countries in our GDP analysis.   5
Development Indicators (WDI).  For per capita consumer expenditure, we set the level 
for each country in 2000 to the value given by the WDI for PPP-adjusted per capita GDP 
multiplied by the share of nominal personal consumer expenditure in the country’s 
nominal GDP. 
  Sample-selection issues particularly affect disaster studies because data tend to be 
absent during the worst crises, especially wars.  As an example, Mexico has GDP data 
since 1895 but is missing reliable information between 1910 and 1919, the period that 
includes the Revolution and Civil War.  Inclusion of the incomplete Mexican time series 
since 1895 in our analysis would bias downward estimated disaster probabilities.  That is, 
the missing period almost surely contains a crisis.
2  An analogous situation is Turkey, 
where data start in 1923, shortly after the likely crisis for the Ottoman Empire during 
World War I.  Even the United States is a concern because of missing data during the U.S. 
Civil War, likely a crisis event, though prior to our starting date of 1870.  Our main 
response to this selection issue has been to try to expand the set of countries with at least 
roughly estimated full time series.  At present, we take the approach of excluding cases 
with (selected) gaps in data.  For example, our analysis of consumer expenditure and 
GDP omits Mexico and Turkey, as well as Malaysia and Singapore, which are missing 
data around World War II.  Similarly, our analysis of consumer expenditure omits South 
Korea because of missing data during World War II and the Korean War. 
  The construction of estimates of real personal consumer expenditure relied on 
various procedures.  In many cases, we used existing long-term national-accounts studies.  
Sometimes (e.g., Canada before 1926) we estimated C as a residual, starting from GDP 
and subtracting estimates of the components of GDP aside from C.  Sometimes (e.g., 
                                                 
2 We believe that we will eventually be able to fill in the missing Mexican data.   6
Switzerland before 1948 and Germany around WWI) we estimated C from quantities of 
specific consumption items, using estimates of expenditure shares to calculate changes in 
aggregate C.  The details of our procedures will appear in a report to be posted on the 
Internet. 
  One recurring issue is the treatment of border changes.  An illustration is the 
reunification of Germany in late 1990.  We have data on per capita C and GDP for West 
Germany up to 1990 (ignoring, for now, the previous border changes) and also after 1990.  
We have data for unified Germany from 1991 on.  Since per capita C and GDP in East 
Germany (not well measured prior to 1991) were much lower than in the West, the raw 
data on per capita quantities would show sharp drops in 1991 if we combined the West 
German values up to 1990 with the unified Germany values thereafter.  That is, this 
approach would treat the unification as a disaster event from the perspective of West 
Germans leading up to 1990.  This perspective may or may not be accurate for this 
particular border change,
3 but we do not want to apply this approach to border changes in 
general (where the implication would be that the initially richer part inevitably regards 
the coming combination as a disaster, and vice versa for the poorer part). 
  Even without border changes, the use of per capita C or GDP as a macro variable 
neglects the distribution of expenditure and income within a country.  This 
macroeconomic approach, valid under some conditions,
4 assumes that we can apply a 
representative-agent framework to the macro variables, despite the underlying 
heterogeneity in productivity, wealth, and so on.  In this case, the joining of West 
                                                 
3 As an analogy, some South Koreans view a reunification with North Korea as a pending disaster. 
4 For example, Caselli and Ventura (2000) show that the neoclassical growth model can provide a 
satisfactory representative-agent view of macroeconomic variables despite heterogeneity in underlying 
productivity and wealth.   7
Germany with another state (East Germany) that happens to have distributions of 
expenditure and income with lower mean values need not invalidate the representative-
agent representation.  The appropriate macro-level procedure is then to smoothly paste 
together in 1990-91 the initial per capita series for West Germany with that for unified 
Germany thereafter.  That is, the West German per capita growth rates apply up to 1991, 
and the unified Germany growth rates apply thereafter—with no discrete shift in levels of 
variables at the time of the reunification.  We apply this methodology to all of our cases 
of border change because we think that this approach can yield satisfactory measures of 
per capita growth rates across these changes.  However, this procedure can be misleading 
with regard to levels of variables.  These issues do not affect our main analysis but do 
matter for our planned effort to construct measures of per capita C and GDP for broad 
groups of countries, such as the total of the OECD.   
  Table 2 shows means and standard deviations, by country, for annual growth rates 
of real per capita consumer expenditure, C, and real per capita GDP.  We consider here 
only cases with annual data from 1914 or earlier.  The sample periods end in 2006 and go 
back as far as possible until 1870 (that is, the first observation is for the growth rate from 
1869 to 1870).     
  Table 3 considers three sub-periods:  1870-1913 (pre-World War I), 1914-1947 
(which includes the two world wars and the Great Depression of the early 1930s), and 
1948-2006 (post-World War II).  The table shows averages across countries of growth 
rates and standard deviations of growth rates (as shown for full samples in Table 2).
5  For 
the full sample, 1870-2006, the average of the growth rates of C for 20 countries is 0.020, 
                                                 
5 In order to have at least ten years of coverage for the 1870-1913 sub-period, this table considers only 
countries with data back at least to 1904.   8
with an average standard deviation of 0.060.  The average for the 17 OECD countries is 
0.019 (s.d.=0.054), and that for the 5 non-OECD countries is 0.024 (s.d.=0.077).  For 
GDP, the average growth rate for 31 countries is 0.020 (average s.d.=0.057).  The 
average for the 21 OECD countries is 0.020 (s.d.=0.054), and that for the 10 non-OECD 
countries is 0.020 (s.d.=0.062). 
  Table 3 shows that the last sub-period, 1948-2006, has higher growth rates and 
lower standard deviations than the first sub-period, 1870-1913.  For example, for GDP 
growth in the OECD countries, the reduction in the standard deviation—from 0.037 in 
1870-1913 to 0.028 in 1948-2006—is the kind of change found by Romer (1986) for the 
United States and plausibly attributed by her mainly to improved measurement of 
macroeconomic aggregates.  However, the most striking difference across the sub-periods 
is the turbulence of the middle interval.  For C growth in the OECD group, the average 
standard deviation for 1914-1947 is 0.087, compared to 0.041 for 1870-1913 and 0.026 
for 1948-2006.  Similarly, for GDP growth in the OECD, the average standard deviation 
for the middle interval is 0.089, compared to 0.037 and 0.028 in the other two periods. 
  An important feature of the 1870-2006 samples is that they include realizations of 
disasters, notably those that occurred in the 1914-1947 sub-period, which featured the 
two world wars and the Great Depression.  These realizations create fat tails indicated by 
excess kurtosis and lead, thereby, usually to rejection in long samples of the hypothesis of 
normality for growth rates of C or GDP.
6  For C growth, the 1 case out of 20 in which 
normality is accepted (by a Jarque-Bera test) at the 5% level is the United States 
(p-value=0.23).  For GDP growth, normality is accepted among 31 cases only for Iceland 
                                                 
6 The tendency for negative skewness—disasters rather than bonanzas—is less pronounced than we 
anticipated.  Over the long samples, for C growth, 11 of the 20 countries exhibit negative skewness, and for 
GDP growth, 23 of the 31 exhibit negative skewness.   9
(p-value=0.07), Switzerland (p-value=0.15), Brazil (p-value=0.05), and Uruguay 
(p-value=0.51). 
  Appendix II has long-term graphs of real per capita GDP and consumer 
expenditure, C, for the 22 countries that have annual data on both variables from before 
1914.  In each case, the vertical axis has a natural-log scale that ranges from 5.5 ($245 in 
2000 U.S. dollars) to 11.0 ($59900 in 2000 U.S. dollars).  These graphs bring out the 
long-term trends and show the major economic contractions.  Note that a movement by 
0.1 along the vertical axis corresponds to a change in the level of per capita GDP or C by 
about 10%. 
  As an example, for Germany, GDP and C fell during World War II, World War I, 
and the Great Depression of the 1930s.  For France, the dominant contraction was during 
World War II, with a lesser decline in World War I.  For Spain, the main adverse event is 
the Civil War of the late 1930s.  The United Kingdom shows declines in C during the two 
world wars.  GDP did not fall during the wars but decreased during the war aftermaths.  
In the United States, the main declines in C took place during the Great Depression of the 
early 1930s and in the early 1920s.  GDP also fell at these times, as well as in the 
aftermath of World War II.  Unusual is the very strong behavior of U.S. GDP during 
World War II, while C remained fairly stable.  The United States is also an outlier in the 
sense of passing the “ruler test”—a ruler placed along the pre-1914 data happens to lie 
along the observations post-1950.  As noted in Cogley (1990, Table 2) and Barro (2009), 
the United States is almost unique in displaying this apparent tendency for the GDP data 
to return to a fixed trend line.  In the other cases (even including Canada, which comes 
close), the fixed-trend hypothesis is rejected by the GDP data.     10
  We plan to examine thoroughly the statistical properties of the full time series of 
GDP and C for our universe of countries in future research with Emi Nakamura and Jón 
Steinsson.  The data set corresponding to the appendix figures and to the available time 
series for other countries will be posted on the Internet. 
 
II.  Rates of Return 
  Our study involves the interplay between macroeconomic variables—represented 
by consumer expenditure and GDP—and rates of return on various kinds of financial 
assets.  Our present work does not make a major contribution to the construction of long-
term data on asset returns.  Instead, we rely mainly on existing information, primarily that 
provided by Global Financial Data (see Taylor [2005]).  Table 4 shows the dates over 
which we have been able to assemble time series on real rates of return.  In all cases, we 
compute arithmetic real rates of return, using consumer price indexes to deflate nominal-
return indexes.  As far as possible, the return indexes and CPIs apply to the end of each 
year.  Therefore, rates of return are averages for each year. 
  Table 4 considers three types of assets:  stocks, short-term bills (Treasury bills 
with maturity of three months or less and analogous claims, such as deposits), and long-
term government bonds (usually ten-year maturity).  For stocks, some of the information 
comes from total-return indexes, which combine price changes and dividends.  In other 
cases, we estimated returns from stock-price indexes, using rough estimates of dividend 
yields.  We expect eventually to be able to use data from Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton 
(2008) to extend our stock-return data backwards for at least Canada, Denmark, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.   11
  Table 5 shows means and standard deviations of rates of return for countries with 
nearly continuous annual time series back at least to the 1920s.
7  The first columns show 
stock and bill returns, where a common sample applies in each case to the two types of 
returns.  The last columns show analogous information for bond and bill returns.  We 
emphasize in the present study the comparison between stocks and bills—and, hence, the 
customary equity premium—though we plan in the future to analyze the premium of 
bonds over bills. 
  For 17 countries, the mean real rates of return over long-term samples were 
0.0829 for stocks and 0.0072 for bills.  (For each country, we used a common sample for 
stock and bill returns.)  Thus, the average equity premium was 0.0757.  For the 15 OECD 
countries, the average rates of return were 0.0793 for stocks and 0.0093 for bills, with an 
average equity premium of 0.0699. 
  Since the stock returns refer to levered equity, the equity premium for unlevered 
equity would be smaller.  For example, with a debt-equity ratio of one-half (roughly that 
for U.S. non-financial corporations in recent years), the predicted premium for unlevered 
equity would be 0.0757/1.5 = 0.050.  Thus, we take as a challenge for the model to 
explain an unlevered equity premium of around 5% per year.  This type of challenge is 
the one taken up long ago by Mehra and Prescott (1985). 
  The model should also be consistent with observed levels of rates of return, 
including an average real bill rate of less than 1% per year.  However, in the model 
simulations, we choose the rate of time preference, ρ, to accord with the observed 
                                                 
7 The missing data for this group—involving 2-5 years each for 6 countries—are mainly during large wars, 
for which real rates of return on all three assets were probably sharply negative.  This sample selection 
clearly biases all measured rates of return upward, although the quantitative effect cannot be too large 
because of the small number of years involved.  The effect on computed equity premia is likely to be even 
smaller.   12
average level of the real bill rate (taken as a rough estimate of a risk-free rate, although 
bills are not literally risk-free).  The reasoning is that the main basis for assessing a 
plausible value of ρ is to consider whether the implied levels of rates of return are 
reasonable.  Therefore, matching overall levels of rates of return does not provide a test 
of the model. 
  For 15 countries (14 OECD), the average long-term rate of return on bonds was 
0.0266, compared to 0.0147 for bills over common samples.  Thus, the average bond-bill 
premium was 0.0119.  The model considered later will not explain the bond-bill premium, 
but extensions of this model may work (see Gabaix [2008]). 
  Table 5 shows the familiar high annual standard deviation of stock returns—an 
average of 0.248 for the 17 countries with matched bill data (0.235 for the 15 OECD 
countries).  The corresponding average standard deviation for bill returns was 0.089 
(0.082 for the 15 OECD countries).  Thus, bill returns had substantial volatility but not 
nearly as great as stocks.  As discussed later, the occurrences of low real bill returns tend 
to be associated with high inflation rates.   
  
III.  Consumption and GDP Disasters 
  To isolate economic disasters for C and GDP, we first follow the procedure in 
Barro (2006) by computing peak-to-trough fractional declines that exceed some threshold 
amount.  The earlier study used a lower bound of 0.15, but we broaden this limit here to 
0.10.  The inclusion of contractions between 0.10 and 0.15 brings in a lot of events but 
turns out to have only moderate implications for explaining asset returns.   13
  The peak-to-trough method for assessing the size of contractions is reasonable if 
growth-rate shocks are i.i.d., so that level shocks are permanent.  However, the method 
can be misleading when some shocks to levels are temporary.  Later we modify the 
approach by using one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filters to attempt to gauge long-run, as 
opposed to transitory, economic contractions.  In our ongoing research with Nakamura 
and Steinsson, we are taking a formal statistical approach that considers transitional 
probabilities for movements between normal and crisis regimes and that allows for 
varying degrees of long-term effects of crises on levels of C and GDP. 
  The full results on measuring C crises are in Tables 6 and 7.  The coverage is 21 
OECD countries—17 with enough data for our subsequent analysis—and 14 non-
OECD—5 in our later analysis.  For GDP, shown in Tables 8 and 9, the coverage is 21 
OECD countries—all used in our subsequent analysis—and 18 non-OECD—14 in our 
later analysis.  For the samples used later, the mean size of C contraction (87 events for 
22 countries) was 21.8%, and the mean size of GDP contraction (148 events for 35 
countries) was 20.8%.   
  To highlight some cases, the United States has been comparatively immune to 
crises, with C declines of 16% in 1921 (possibly influenced by the influenza epidemic of 
1918-20) and 21% during the Great Depression in 1933.  GDP declines were 10% in 
1908 and 1914 (which featured banking panics
8), 12% in 1921, 29% in 1933, and 16% in 
1947.  The last contraction, likely precipitated by the post-World War II demobilization, 
did not exhibit a consumption decline.  For the United Kingdom, the two C crises were 
during the world wars—17% in 1918 and 1943.  There were no GDP disasters at these 
times, but GDP did contract after the two wars—by 19% in 1921 and 15% in 1947.   
                                                 
8See Cagan (1965, p. 138).   14
 For  France, we found 3 war-related disasters for C:  16% in 1871 (Franco-
Prussian War), 22% in 1915 (WWI), and 58% in 1943 (WWII).  For GDP, there were 6 
contractions, the largest 41% in 1944.  For Germany, there were 4 C crises:  42% in 1918 
(WWI), 13% in 1923 (German hyperinflation), 12% in 1932 (Great Depression), and 
41% in 1945 (WWII).  There were also 4 crises indicated by GDP, the largest a 
remarkable 74% in 1946 (reflecting the economic collapse late in WWII).   
  Many other countries had sharp contractions during World War II.  For example, 
for C, Belgium fell by 53% up to 1942, Greece contracted by 64% up to 1944, Japan fell 
by 64% up to 1945, the Netherlands contracted by 55% up to 1944, and Taiwan fell by 
68% up to 1945.  Other noteworthy cases for C were the contractions in Spain during the 
Spanish Civil War by 46% up to 1937 and in Chile during the Pinochet “revolution” by 
40% up to 1976.   
  U.S. studies often focus on the severity of the Great Depression; in fact, some 
researchers gauge disaster probabilities entirely from this single event (see, for example, 
Chatterjee and Corbae [2007] and Cogley and Sargent [2008]).  One reason for the U.S. 
focus on the Depression is that the United States happened to do well economically 
during the two world wars, which were major economic disasters for much of the rest of 
the world, including many OECD countries.  Even if one’s concern is limited to 
forecasting U.S. disasters or studying disaster probabilities as perceived by investors in 
the United States, it seems plausible that the global experience—particularly of 
comparable OECD countries—would provide a great deal of information.  Our 
perspective is that U.S. prospects can be gauged much better by consulting the global 
experience, rather than overweighting the own U.S. history—for which the few observed   15
disasters are likely to be dominated by luck.  Our ongoing research with Emmanuel Farhi 
and Xavier Gabaix seeks to check this perspective by using prices of U.S. stock-index 
options since the early 1980s to gauge directly the time-varying disaster probability as 
perceived by U.S. investors. 
  In a global context at least since 1870, the most serious economic disaster in 
terms of incidence and severity of declines in C and GDP was World War II.  This event 
was followed in terms of economic impact by World War I and the Great Depression of 
the early 1930s—which had similar overall consequences.   
  For the broad group of 35 countries included for consumer expenditure in Table 6, 
World War II had 22 crises with an average size of 34% (see Table 7).  World War I had 
19 crises with an average size of 24%, and the Great Depression had 18 with an average 
size of 21%.  The 1920s had another 10 events—8 with troughs in 1920-21—with an 
average size of 19%.  As already suggested for the United States, the contractions at the 
start of the 1920s may reflect the influenza epidemic of 1918-20 (Ursúa [2008]).  We also 
found 21 pre-1914 events (for a truncated sample because of missing data) with an 
average size of 16%.   
  The post-World War II period was remarkably calm for the OECD countries—
only nine consumption crises, four of which were in Iceland (relating in part to shocks to 
the fishing industry).  The largest outside of Iceland was 14% for Finland in the early 
1990s (a crisis thought to originate from the changed economic relationship with the 
former Soviet Union).  However, economic crises have not disappeared in the world, as is 
clear from the 28 non-OECD consumption events with an average size of 18%.  The 
disasters here include the Latin-American debt crisis of the early 1980s, the Asian   16
financial crisis of the late 1990s, and difficulties in 2001-02 in Argentina related to the 
collapse of the currency board. 
  Tables 8 and 9 provide a roughly similar picture for crises gauged by per capita 
GDP.  For the broad group of 38 countries included in Table 8, World War II had 25 
events with an average size of 36% (see Table 9).  World War I had 26 events with a 
mean size of 21%, and the Great Depression had 22 cases with an average size of 22%.  
The 1920s had another 15 events—10 with troughs in 1920-21—with a mean size of 18%.  
The pre-1914 period (more plentiful than for consumer expenditure in terms of available 
data) showed 46 events, with an average size of 16%.  The post-World War II period 
featured only 6 events for the OECD; the largest were the post-World War II aftermaths 
for the United States (16%) and the United Kingdom (15%).  Again, the situation was 
much less calm outside of the OECD—24 events with an average size of 17%. 
 
IV.  Consumer Durables 
  The consumption concept that enters into asset-pricing equations would be closer 
to real consumer expenditure on non-durables and services (subsequently referred to as 
non-durables) than to overall consumer expenditure.  That is, we might want to exclude 
durables outlays—or, better yet, include an estimate of rental income on the slowly 
moving stock of durables.  However, except for post-World War II OECD countries 
(which had few crises), we typically lack the data to divide personal consumer 
expenditure into durables versus non-durables. 
  Table 10 shows the 28 cases among the C-disasters from Table 6 for which we 
have been able to locate data that permit a breakdown in the decline in real personal   17
consumer expenditure into durables versus non-durables.  Among the 28 cases, 18 are in 
our main sample of 87 C crises.  Not surprisingly, the proportionate decreases in durables 
were typically much larger than those in non-durables.  On average for the 28 crises, the 
proportionate fall in real per capita personal consumer expenditure was 18.3%, that in 
durables was 39.6%, and that in non-durables was 15.1%.  Thus, a substitution of non-
durables expenditure for overall consumer expenditure would reduce the mean size of 
contraction among the selected 28 by about 3 percentage points. 
  The main reason that the adjustment for durables has only a moderate, though 
significant, impact is that the share of nominal durables expenditure in the total of 
personal consumer expenditure is usually not large—averaging 8.0% at the peaks and 
5.8% at the troughs for the 28 cases considered in Table 10.
9  As an extreme example, for 
the United Kingdom during World War II, the measured durables share fell to only 2.3% 
in 1943 (with household automobiles falling to near zero).  But since the durables share 
of nominal personal consumer expenditure at the peak in 1938 was only 4.9%, the 
adjustment was still only 2.5 percentage points; that is, the proportionate fall in non-
durables was 14.4%, compared to 16.9% for personal consumer expenditure. 
  Our measured durables adjustment of 3 percentage points likely overstates the 
overall effects.  The reason is that we are systematically missing data for the larger crises 
on the durables/non-durables division—the mean contraction in C for the 28 cases in 
Table 10 was 18.3%, compared to a mean of 21.8% for the 87 C contractions that we use 
in our subsequent analysis.  The largest C contractions in Table 10 are 46% for Spain in 
1937, 36% for Finland in 1918, 33% for Chile in 1985, and 32% for Venezuela in 1989. 
                                                 
9 The change in the nominal share of durables from peak to trough depends partly on the relative growth 
rates of real durables versus non-durables and partly on the relative growth rates of prices of durables 
versus non-durables.   18
  Consider an arithmetic formula for the magnitude of the proportionate change in 
non-durables—this formula applies when durables and non-durables are both declining, 
with the size of the fractional decline in durables exceeding that in non-durables: 
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where C is total consumer expenditure, D is durables expenditure, and ND is non-
durables expenditure.  We already noted that the size of the adjustment is limited by the 
modest share of durables in total expenditure—this effect comes through the term D/ND 
in Eq. (1).   
  An additional effect in Eq. (1) is that, as we consider contractions with larger 
magnitude for ΔC/C, the difference between the size of ΔD/D and that of ΔC/C must, at 
least eventually, get smaller.  For example, the largest possible magnitude of ΔD/D is one.  
In this extreme situation, the amount of adjustment in switching to non-durables has to 
fall as the size of ΔC/C gets larger (with the adjustment approaching zero as the size of 
ΔC/C approaches one).  This reasoning suggests that the durables adjustment (in 
percentage points) would tend to be less important for the larger crises—and these are the 
ones that matter most for replicating the equity premium in our later analysis.  We do see 
this pattern in Table 10—for Spain in 1937, the adjustment is from 46.1% to 45.0%; for 
Finland in 1918, the adjustment is from 36.0% to 35.3%; and for Venezuela in 1989, the 
adjustment is from 32.0% to 29.9%.  However, for Chile in 1985, the adjustment is much 
larger—from 32.7% to 17.9%. 
  In any event, we lack information in most cases on the breakdown of personal 
consumer expenditure into durables versus non-durables.  Although we may add a few 
cases, we will not be able to go much beyond the coverage shown in Table 10.  Therefore,   19
we apply the rest of our analysis to crises gauged by personal consumer expenditure, C, 
in Table 6, as well as to crises measured by GDP in Table 8. 
 
V.  Consumer Expenditure and GDP Disasters Compared 
  Table 11 matches disasters for personal consumer expenditure, C, and GDP for 
countries with full data (17 OECD and 5 non-OECD).  We match the C and GDP 
contractions in Tables 6 and 8, respectively, by trough years—either the same or a nearby 
year.  In some cases, a contraction by 0.10 or more in C or GDP does not pair up with a 
decline by at least 0.10 in the other variable (in which case, the decline in the other 
variable does not appear in Table 6 or 8).  In those cases, we enter in Table 11 the actual 
decline in the other variable (where, for a few cases, a negative value means that the 
variable increased). 
  Macroeconomists, particularly those familiar with U.S. data, tend to believe that 
proportionate contractions in consumer expenditure during recessions are typically 
smaller than those in GDP.  Partly this view comes from the Great Depression, and the 
numbers in Tables 6 and 8 verify this view:  as an example, the proportionate declines in 
the United States up to 1933 were 21% for C and 29% for GDP.  The idea that C is 
relatively more stable than GDP reflects also the general patterns in post-World War II 
macroeconomic fluctuations, including those in the United States.  Since 1954, the 
standard deviation of the cyclical part of U.S. real GDP was 1.6%, compared to 1.2% for 
real consumer expenditure (Barro [2008, p. 185]).  The main counter-part of the smoother 
behavior of C than of GDP was the sharply fluctuating investment.  That is, the steep 
declines in investment during U.S. recessions, including the Great Depression, partly   20
buffered the decreases in consumer expenditure.
10  This buffering could also apply, in 
principle, to the current-account balance; that is, a procyclical current account would 
moderate the fluctuations in consumer spending (and investment) relative to those in 
GDP.  However, in the post-1954 period, the ratio of the U.S. current-account balance to 
GDP was actually weakly counter-cyclical (Barro [2008, p. 429]). 
  From a theoretical standpoint (and despite the validity of the permanent-income 
idea), it is not inevitable that consumption would fluctuate proportionately by less than 
GDP.  These patterns depend on whether the underlying macroeconomic shocks impinge 
more on investment demand or desired saving.  This balance depends, in turn, on the 
permanence of the shocks and whether they operate primarily as income effects or as 
shifts to the productivity of capital.  In a simple AK model with i.i.d. shocks to the 
growth rate of productivity, A, consumption and GDP would always have the same 
proportionate variations. 
  An important consideration during wartime is the sharp increase in government 
purchases for the military.  This expansion of G decreases C (and investment), for given 
GDP.
11  In our data, many of the C and GDP crises—and a disproportionate share of the 
larger crises—feature these wartime expansions of G.  In such circumstances, it is not 
surprising that C would decline proportionately by more than GDP. 
  Table 11 covers 102 contractions overall, 70 for OECD countries and 32 for non-
OECD.  Of the 102 contractions, 26 featured participation as a war combatant and 76 
were non-war (where the label “non-war” includes non-combatants during major wars).  
                                                 
10 This pattern is stronger for consumption measured by expenditure on non-durables and services; that is, 
when expenditures on consumer durables are grouped with investment. 
11 The declines in consumption and investment could be moderated by a fall in the current-account balance; 
however, the option of borrowing from abroad tends to be severely limited during a global conflict.   21
In the 76 non-war cases, the average proportionate decrease in C was slightly greater than 
that in GDP—14.5% versus 13.1% (12.7% versus 12.3% for the OECD countries).  In the 
26 war cases, the margin was greater—33.3% versus 28.8% (32.9% versus 28.4% for the 
OECD countries). 
  In terms of timing patterns, Table 11 shows for the full sample of 102 crises that 
59 have the same trough years for C and GDP.   The trough year for C comes later in 23 
cases and earlier in 20 cases.  Thus, at least in the annual data, there is no clear pattern as 
to whether C or GDP declines first during non-war crises.  For wartime cases, 13 of the 
26 have the same year, whereas C moves later in 4 and earlier in 9.  Thus, there is a slight 
suggestion that the declines in C during wartime crises tend to precede those in GDP.  
This pattern makes sense since the rise in government purchases early in a war could 
reduce C before any physical destruction caused a fall in GDP. 
  One concern is that the apparent excess of the average size of C contractions over 
GDP contractions might reflect greater measurement error in the C data.  In our planned 
formal statistical analysis of the C and GDP time series, we will allow for measurement 
error that might differ across countries, over time, and between the C and GDP data.  For 
now, we can get some idea about the role of measurement error by redoing the analysis 
using trend values of log(C) and log(GDP) calculated from Hodrick-Prescott filters.  We 
use a conventional smoothing parameter for annual data of 100.  Unlike the standard 
setup, we use one-sided filters; that is, we considered only current and past values at each 
point in time when estimating “trends.”  (This procedure avoids the implication that 
people knew in advance of a coming destructive war or depression, so that they knew that 
a major decline in trend C or GDP was about to happen.)  Instead of computing   22
proportionate peak-to-trough decreases in C or GDP during crises, we now calculate the 
proportionate peak-to-trough decreases in the HP-trend values.  This procedure 
downplays short-lived contractions and tends to count, instead, only the more persistent 
declines.  The procedure also tends to filter out downturns that are just a response to a 
previous upward blip in C or GDP.  Most importantly in the present context, the HP-filter 
tends to eliminate “crises” that reflect mainly temporary measurement error in C and 
GDP. 
  The HP-filtering procedure substantially reduces the number of disasters—from 
87 to 38 for C and from 148 to 68 for GDP.  The full results are in Tables A1 and A2 in 
Appendix III.  We matched the C and GDP crises, as before.  There are 28 non-war pairs, 
17 OECD and 11 non-OECD.  There are 21 wartime pairs, 19 OECD and 2 non-OECD.  
In the non-war sample, the average size of C decline was 11.6%, compared to 13.8% for 
GDP (8.8% versus 13.4% for the OECD countries).  In the war sample, the mean size of 
C decline was 29.1%, compared to 23.3% for GDP (27.4% versus 21.7% for the OECD 
countries).  Thus, the HP-filtered data generate patterns for war samples that are similar 
to those found before—the average magnitude of C decline was notably larger than that 
for GDP.  However, the findings for non-war samples are reversed—the average size of 
C decline was smaller than that for GDP.  Thus, overall, the main robust finding is that C 
tends to fall proportionately more than GDP during wartime crises.  The relative 
magnitude of decline during non-war crises is less clear and may be roughly similar for C 
and GDP. 
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VI.  Disaster Probability and the Frequency Distribution of Disaster Sizes 
  In this section, we study the sample of countries with essentially complete annual 
time series since before 1914.  We use 22 countries (17 OECD) on per capita consumer 
expenditure, C, and 35 countries (21 OECD) on per capita GDP.
12  For the C-sample of 
22 countries, we isolated 87 disasters (Table 6).  The upper panel of Figure 1 plots the 
frequency distribution of these C-declines.  The bottom panel shows the frequency 
distribution of the duration of these disasters (gauged, in each case, by the number of 
years from “peak” to “trough”).  The average size was 22%, and the average duration was 
3.6 years.  For the GDP-sample of 35 countries, we found 148 disasters (Table 8).  The 
upper panel of Figure 2 plots the frequency distribution of these GDP-declines, and the 
bottom panel shows the frequency distribution of the disaster durations.  The average size 
was 21%, and the average duration was 3.5 years. 
  In our subsequent simulation of a model of the equity premium, using the disaster 
data to calibrate the model, the results depend mainly on the probability, p, of disaster 
and the frequency distribution of proportionate disaster size, b.  With substantial risk 
aversion, the key aspect of the size distribution is not so much the mean of b but, rather, 
the fatness of the tails; that is, the likelihood of extremely large disasters. 
  Suppose that there are two states, normalcy and disaster.  With probability p per 
year (taken here to be constant over time and across countries), the economy shifts from 
normalcy to disaster.  With another probability π per year (also constant over time and 
across countries), the economy shifts from disaster to normalcy.  As mentioned before, 
we found 87 disasters for C and 148 for GDP.  Also as noted before, we measured 
                                                 
12 We include Greece and the Philippines in the GDP sample.  Although GDP data are missing for Greece 
in 1944 and for the Philippines in 1941-45, we can compute the peak-to-trough GDP declines during WWII 
in each case:  66% for Greece from 1939 to 1942 and 57% for the Philippines from 1939 to 1946.   24
disaster-years by the interval between peak and trough for each event.  This calculation 
yields 312 disaster-years for C and 516 for GDP.  The total number of annual 
observations is 2762 for C and 4511 for GDP.  Therefore, the number of normalcy years 
is 2450 for C and 3995 for GDP.  We estimate p as the ratio of the number of disasters to 
the number of normalcy years.  This calculation yields p=0.0355 for C and 0.0370 for 
GDP.
13  We estimate π as the ratio of number of disasters (all of which eventually ended) 
to the number of disaster-years.  This computation gives π=0.279 for C and 0.287 for 
GDP.  Therefore, whether we gauge by C or GDP, we can think of disasters as starting 
with a probability of around 3.6% per year and ending with a probability of about 28% 
per year. 
  Our present theoretical model, summarized below, does not deal explicitly with 
the duration of disaster states.  In the theory, a disaster is a jump that takes place in one 
period, which amounts to an instant of time.  The model that we are constructing with 
Nakamura and Steinsson will deal explicitly with the time evolution of the economy 
during disaster states.  For present purposes, we assume that the important aspect of a 
disaster is the cumulative amount of contraction, b, which we gauge by the numbers 
shown for C and GDP, respectively, in Tables 6 and 8.  That is, we assume that, for a 
given cumulative decline, the implications for the equity premium do not depend a great 
deal on whether this decline occurs in an instant of time or is, more realistically, spread 
out over a few years.
14   
                                                 
13The main reason that these disaster probabilities exceed those in Barro (2006) is the inclusion of disaster 
sizes between 0.10 and 0.15.  If we consider only disasters of 0.15 or greater, the probabilities are p=0.0213 
for C and 0.0198 for GDP. 
14Barro (2006, section V) studied the effect on the equity premium from varying the length of the period, T, 
in the model—this extension was feasible within the context of a model with i.i.d. growth shocks.  In this 
setting, T represents the fixed duration of a disaster.  Variations in T between 0 and 5 years did not have a 
large impact on the implied equity premium.     25
  The frequency distributions for disaster size, b, shown for C and GDP, 
respectively, in the upper panels of Figures 1 and 2, turn out to be well approximated by 
Pareto or power-law forms.  These representations have been found to apply to an array 
of economic and physical phenomena, including amounts of stock-price changes and 
sizes of cities and firms—see Mandelbrot (1963), Fama (1965), and Gabaix (1999).  We 
will work out the application to disaster sizes in future research with Rustam Ibragimov. 
 
VII.  A Lucas-Tree Model of Rates of Return 
  The estimates of p and the b-distribution can be matched with rates of return 
determined in a representative-agent Lucas-tree setting (Lucas [1978]).  Our theoretical 
framework, summarized briefly here, follows Barro (2009), which extends Barro (2006) 
to use the Epstein-Zin-Weil (EZW) form of consumer preferences (Epstein and Zin 
[1989] and Weil [1990]).  That is, we allow for two distinct preference parameters:  γ, the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion, and θ, the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution (IES). 
We set up the model, for convenience, in terms of discrete periods.  However, the 
formulas derived later apply as the length of the period approaches zero.  The log of real 
GDP evolves exogenously as a random walk with drift:  
(2)   log(Yt+1) = log(Yt) + g + ut+1 + vt+1. 
The random term ut+1 is i.i.d. normal with mean 0 and variance σ
2.  This term reflects 
“normal” economic fluctuations due, for example, to productivity shocks.  The parameter 
g≥0 is a constant that reflects exogenous productivity growth.  Population is constant, so 
Yt represents per capita GDP, as well as the level of GDP.   26
  The random term vt+1 in Eq. (2) picks up rare disasters, as in Rietz (1988) and 
Barro (2006).  In these rare events, output and consumption jump down sharply.  The 
probability of a disaster is the constant p≥0 per unit of time.  In a disaster, output and 
consumption contract by the fraction b, where 0<b<1.  The distribution of vt+1 is given by 
   probability  1-p:    vt+1 = 0, 
   probability  p:    vt+1 = log(1-b). 
The disaster size, b, follows some probability distribution, which we gauge by the 
empirical densities shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
  In the baseline Lucas-tree setting—a closed economy with no investment and no 
government purchases—the representative agent’s consumption, Ct, equals output, Yt.
15  
Given the processes that generate ut+1 and vt+1, the expected growth rate of Ct and Yt, 
denoted by g*, is given by 
(3)      g* = g + (1/2)σ
2 – p·Eb, 
where Eb is the expected value of b.  (Note that we have allowed for disasters but not for 
“bonanzas.”) 
  A key simplification—which allows for closed-form solutions—is that the shocks 
ut+1 and vt+1 in Eq. (2) are i.i.d.; that is, they represent permanent effects on the level of 
output, rather than transitory disturbances to the level.  An important part of our ongoing 
research is to reassess this i.i.d. assumption; in particular, to allow for transitory effects 
from disasters, such as wars and financial crises.  (Another important extension, needed 
                                                 
15 Results on asset returns are similar in an AK model with endogenous investment and stochastic (i.i.d.) 
depreciation shocks—see Barro (2009).  In this setting, a disaster amounts to a large-scale destruction of 
Lucas trees.  We can readily incorporate wartime related government purchases, Gt, which do not substitute 
for Ct in household utility but do create a wedge between Yt and Ct.  In this case, an increase in Gt amounts 
to a decrease in productivity.   27
to match observations on rate-of-return volatility, is to allow for time variation in 
uncertainty parameters, particularly the disaster probability, p.) 
  In general, EZW preferences do not yield closed-form solutions for asset-pricing 
equations.  However, Barro (2009) shows that, with i.i.d. shocks (as in the present model), 
the first-order optimizing conditions generate asset-pricing equations of familiar form: 
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where Rt is the one-period gross return on any asset.  The differences from the standard 
power-utility model (γ=θ) are, first, the exponent on consumption is the negative of the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ (not θ), and, second, the effective rate of time 
preference, ρ*, differs from the usual rate of time preference, ρ, when γ≠θ.  The formula 








⋅ − − − − ⋅
−
− ⋅ − ⋅ − − =
− ] ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( [ )
1
( ) 2 / 1 ( * ) ( *




γσ θ γ ρ ρ
γ , 
where E is the expectations operator and g* is the expected growth rate given in Eq. (3). 
  The formulas for the expected rate of return on equity (unlevered claims to Lucas 
trees), r
e, and the risk-free rate, r
f , can be derived from Eq. (4), given the process that 
generates Yt and Ct in Eq. (2).  If we assume zero chance of default on either asset, the 
results are 
 (6)   r
e = ρ* + γg* - (1/2)·γ·(γ-1)·σ
2 - p·[E(1-b)
1-γ - 1 - (γ-1)·Eb], 
 (7)   r
f = ρ* + γg* - (1/2)·γ·(γ+1)·σ
2 - p·[E(1-b)
-γ - 1 - γ·Eb]. 
Hence, the equity premium is 
 (8)   r
e - r
f = γσ
2 + p·[ E(1-b)
-γ - E(1-b)
1-γ - Eb],   28
which depends only on γ and the uncertainty parameters (σ, p, and the distribution of b).  
In practice, the term γσ
2 is negligible (as in the equity-premium puzzle found by Mehra 
and Prescott [1985]).  The disaster term is proportional to p and tends to be large.   
  The key moments of the disaster-size distribution are E(1-b)
-γ and E(1-b)
1-γ.  
Heuristically, we can think of the first term as reflecting the expected marginal utility of 
consumption, conditional on a fractional decline in C by the amount b.
16  The second 
term comes from the crisis-contingent expectation of the product of R, the gross return on 
unlevered equity, and (1-b)
-γ.  Since real stock prices (for unlevered equity) fall in a crisis 
by the same fraction, b, as C and GDP, the relevant expectation becomes E(1-b)
1-γ.  Note 
that the two key moments depend on the form of the b-distribution and on γ. 
 
VIII.  Simulating the Lucas-Tree Model 
  We now simulate the Lucas-tree model by viewing the Euler condition in Eq. (4) 
as applying at each point in time to a representative agent at the country level.  That is, 
we neglect the implications of imperfect markets and heterogeneous individuals within 
countries.  However, we also assume that markets are not sufficiently complete 
internationally for Eq. (4) to apply to the representative agent in the world.  In future 
work, we will assess how the analysis applies to multiple-country regions, rather than 
country by country.   
  In applying Eq. (4) to the determination of each country’s asset returns, we 
neglect any implications from international trade in goods and assets; that is, we 
effectively treat each country as a closed economy.  With this perspective, we can view 
each country/time-period observation as providing independent information about the 
                                                 
16This interpretation would be precise for power utility (γ=θ).   29
relation between macroeconomic shocks and asset returns.  In particular, this 
independence may be approximately right despite the clear common international 
dimensions of crises—most obviously from wars but also from financial crises, 
epidemics of disease, and natural-resource shocks. 
  We apply the full historical information on disaster probability and sizes to the 
simulation at each point in time.  Thus, we implicitly assume that the underlying 
parameters are fixed over time and across countries and are known from day one to the 
representative agent in each country.  That is, we neglect learning about disaster 
parameters, an issue stressed by Weitzman (2007). 
  We focus on the model’s implications for the expected rate of return on equity, r
e, 
and the risk-free rate, r
f—and, hence, the equity premium.  As it stands, the model is 
inadequate for explaining the volatility of asset prices, including stock prices.  For 
example, the model unrealistically implies a constant price-dividend ratio and a constant 
risk-free rate.  The most promising avenue for extending the model to fit these features—
including the high volatility of stock returns—is to allow for shifting uncertainty 
parameters, notably the disaster probability, p.  This possibility is explored in Gabaix 
(2008)—his results suggest that the extended model can explain volatility patterns 
without affecting much the implications for expected rates of return, including the equity 
premium.  In a related vein, Bansal and Yaron (2004) pursue the consequences of shifting 
expected growth rates, g*. 
  The calibrations of the model follow Barro (2009).  We set the expected normal 
growth rate, g, at 0.025; the standard deviation of normal fluctuations, σ, at 0.02; and the 
reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, θ, at 0.5.  These choices either do   30
not affect the equity premium (g and θ) or else have a negligible impact (σ).  The rate of 
time preference, ρ, also does not affect the equity premium.  However, ρ (along with g, σ, 
and θ) affects levels of rates of return, including the risk-free rate, r
f (see Eqs. [6] and [7]).  
Given the lack of useful outside information on ρ, we set ρ* in Eq. (7) to generate 
r
f=0.01—roughly the long-run average across countries of real rates of return on bills 
from Table 5.
17  Then ρ takes on the value needed to satisfy Eq. (5).   
  The disaster probability, p, and the frequency distribution of disaster sizes, b, 
come from our multi-country study of disaster events.  We can then determine the value 
of γ needed in Eq. (8) to replicate an unlevered equity premium of around 0.05—the 
long-run average across countries implied by the data in Table 5.  Since we always have 
r
f=0.01, an unlevered equity premium of 0.05 corresponds to an expected rate of return 
on unlevered equity, r
e, of 0.06. 
  Table 12 applies to crises gauged by consumer expenditure, and Table 13 uses the 
crises gauged by GDP.  For baseline cases, which encompass 87 observations of C crises 
and 148 observations of GDP crises, a coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, of 3.5 gets 
the simulated results into the right ballpark for the observed equity premium; specifically, 
r
e=0.061 in the C case and 0.069 in the GDP case.  The respective rates of time 
preference, ρ, are 0.046 and 0.054, and the corresponding effective rates of time 
preference, ρ*, are 0.030 and 0.039. 
  The results are sensitive to the choice of γ.  For example, the second lines of 
Tables 12 and 13 show that, if γ=3.0, the values for r
e fall to 0.043 in the C case and 
0.046 in the GDP case. 
                                                 
17Real rates of return on Treasury Bills and similar assets are not risk-free—and tend particularly to be 
lower than normal during crises that involve high inflation (see  Section IX).  Thus, r
f may be lower than 
0.01.  However, pegging to a lower value of r
f would not affect our analysis of the equity premium.   31
  The results are not very different if the sample encompasses only the OECD 
countries, in which case the number of C disasters falls from 87 to 57, and the number of 
GDP disasters falls from 148 to 75.  We still get into the right ballpark for the equity 
premium with γ=3.5 (or slightly higher for the case of C crises). 
  The results do not change greatly if we truncate the b-distribution to eliminate 
smaller crises.  Tables 12 and 13 show the results when, instead of b≥0.10, we admit only 
b≥0.15, b≥0.20, b≥0.30, or b≥0.40.  Even in this last case—with only 11 remaining C 
crises and 14 remaining GDP crises— r
e is still at 0.049 in the case of C and 0.055 in the 
case of GDP.  Thus, the larger crises are crucial for getting the equity premium into the 
right ballpark with a “reasonable” amount of risk aversion, such as γ=3.5. 
  This reasoning also applies when we examine non-war samples, a selection that 
eliminates the biggest crises from the sample.  (We define “war” as applying only to 
active combatants.)  For C crises, the consideration of a non-war sample—which retains 
62 of the original 87 disasters—yields r
e=0.017.  For GDP crises, with 111 of the original 
148 disasters retained, the result is again r
e=0.017.  Getting into the right ballpark here for 
the equity premium requires a much higher coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ.  For 
example, Tables 12 and 13 show that γ=9 yields r
e=0.053 for C and 0.059 for GDP. 
  As discussed before, we also redid the analysis using the trend values of log(C) 
and log(GDP) calculated from Hodrick-Prescott filters.  As already noted, this method 
captures in an informal way the idea that crises may have less than permanent effects on 
levels of C and GDP.  In our planned formal statistical modeling, we will take a more 
rigorous approach to dealing with transitory versus permanent shifts in C and GDP.   32
  Tables 12 and 13 show that the HP-filtering procedure substantially reduces the 
number of disasters—from 87 to 38 for C and from 148 to 68 for GDP—and, thereby, 
lowers the estimated disaster probabilities—to 0.0157 for C and 0.0179 for GDP.  
However, the size distributions of the crises are not so different from those in the original 
procedure.  For C crises, the mean of b is 0.236, versus 0.218 in the original case, and for 
GDP, the mean of b is 0.226, rather than 0.208.   
  If we again use a coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, of 3.5, the HP-filtering 
lowers the computed r
e to 0.030 for the C case and to 0.038 for GDP.  However, γ does 
not have to increase very much to restore a reasonable equity premium.  For example, for 
C, γ=4.5 yields r
e=0.051, whereas for GDP, γ=4 yields r
e=0.052. 
  In terms of general patterns, the results based on consumer expenditure, C, in 
Table 12 deliver results for the equity premium that are similar to those based on GDP in 
Table 13.  On the one hand, this finding suggests a kind of robustness in that the results 
are not sensitive to measurement differences in these main macro aggregates.  On the 
other hand, this conclusion also means that fitting the equity premium does not depend on 
our efforts in measuring consumer expenditure and, thereby, getting closer to measures of 
consumption. 
  Overall, the simulations in Tables 12 and 13 show that the model delivers 
reasonable equity premia with “plausible” coefficients of relative risk aversion for a 
variety of specifications.  The main lack of robustness applies to elimination of the 
biggest crises from the sample—for example, by removing the war-related crises. 
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IX.  Asset Returns during Crises 
  In the model in section VII, crises feature downward jumps in consumption and 
GDP at a point in time.  More realistically, C and GDP fall gradually during crises of 
varying lengths.  In our empirical analysis, we approximated the crisis declines in C and 
GDP by cumulated fractional amounts over peak-to-trough intervals, as shown in 
Tables 6 and 8 and Figures 1 and 2.  Now we carry out a preliminary analysis that 
considers observed returns on stocks and bills during crises. 
 
  A.  Stock returns during crises 
  In the theory, real stock prices jump down discretely at the start of a crisis.  More 
realistically, stock prices would fall sharply each time negative information hits the 
financial markets.  Since we are conditioning on crises that cumulate to at least a 10% fall 
in C or GDP, the crises typically feature more than one adverse piece of news (or, rather, 
more negative than positive news).  Thus, the stock-price declines tend also to be spread 
out during the crises.  By analogy to our procedure for measuring decreases in C and 
GDP, we measure the crisis changes in stock prices by cumulative fractional amounts.  
Specifically, the real stock-price falls shown in Tables 6 and 8 are the total fractional 
declines from the end of the year before the peak to the end of the year before the trough.  
(Negative values indicate stock-price increases.)  This procedure omits changes in stock 
prices during the trough year—where the financial markets would likely be influenced by 
information that the crisis had ended. 
  Data on real stock prices are available for only a sub-set of the C and GDP 
crises—51 of the 87 C crises (Table 6) and 71 of the 148 GDP crises (Table 8).  The   34
majority of these crises show declines in real stock prices—39 of 51 (76%) of the C 
events and 55 of 71 (77%) of the GDP events.  Figure 3 shows the size distribution of 
real stock-price declines during crises (where negative values correspond to stock-price 
rises).  The left-hand panels are the full distributions, and the right-hand panels consider 
only the stock-price decreases.  The left-hand panels show a couple outliers with very 
large price increases—Argentina in the late 1980s and Chile in the mid 1970s.  In these 
situations, periods of economic contraction were accompanied by major actual or 
prospective reforms that were viewed favorably by the stock markets.
18  To admit stock-
price increases during crises into the model, we would have to expand to allow for shocks 
to parameters, such as the expected growth rate, g*, or the disaster probability, p. 
  The overall mean and median of fractional stock-price declines were 0.080 and 
0.173, respectively, for C crises and 0.169 and 0.296, respectively, for GDP crises.  
Conditioning on cases of stock-price decrease in the right-hand panels of Figure 3 shows 
roughly uniform shapes for the frequency distributions in the range of sizes between 0 
and 0.7.
19  In this range, the mean and median of stock-price declines were 0.334 and 
0.325, respectively, for C crises and 0.375 and 0.374, respectively, for GDP crises. 
  In Tables 12 and 13, we simulated the underlying asset-pricing model using the 
observed distributions of C and GDP crises.  The underlying assumption was that the size 
of the fractional stock-price decline (for unlevered equity) during a crisis equaled the size 
of the fractional decline, b, in C or GDP.  We can instead simulate the model by using the 
actual stock-price changes during crises from Tables 6 and 8 and Figure 3.  Since these 
                                                 
18An analogous case is Venezuela in the late 1980s—a C crisis in Table 6 that is not included in the sample 
currently being considered. 
19Recall that the samples are selected by considering C or GDP declines of 0.10 or more.  We could, instead, 
select the sample by considering real stock-price declines of 0.10 or more.  Our conjecture is that the size 
distributions would then look like power-law functions, as in Figures 1 and 2.   35
stock returns refer to levered equity, this set of calculations applies to expected returns on 
levered equity. 
  The asset-pricing condition in Eq. (4) involves the term E[Rt·(1-b)
-γ], where Rt is 
the gross real stock return during crises, and b is the fractional decline in C (or GDP) 
during crises.  This expression is difficult to calculate accurately because stock-price 
changes are highly volatile, particularly during crises.
20  In Table 14, we compute this 
term in four alternative ways.  First, we measure contractions by either C or GDP, and 
second, we use either the full distributions of stock-price changes (the left-hand panels of 
Figure 3) or the truncated distributions that consider only stock-price decreases (the right-
hand panels of Figure 3).  We think that the last choice may lessen the effects from 
measurement error. 
  The calculations using the full distributions of stock-price changes do not accord 
well with observed long-term average returns on levered equity of around 0.083 (from 
Table 5).  The simulations, using γ=3.5 as before, deliver an overall mean rate of return 
on levered equity of 0.029 for C crises and 0.031 for GDP crises.  The results fit better if 
we use the truncated distributions, which eliminate cases of stock-price increases during 
crises.  In particular, for C crises, the simulated mean rate of return on levered equity is 
then 0.077.  Given the wide range of results, we cannot, at this stage, reach firm 
conclusions from our attempts to simulate the model using observed stock-price changes 
during crises. 
  
                                                 
20An additional difficulty is the imperfect matching of the timing of stock-price changes with the timing of 
the declines in C or GDP.  In our approach, stock-price changes are from the end of the year prior to the 
peak to the end of the year prior to the trough.  The changes in C or GDP are from the peak year to the 
trough year, with C and GDP representing annual flows for each year.   36
  B.  Bill returns during crises 
  In the model from section VII, the risk-free rate is the same in normal times as in 
a crisis, which lasts an instant of time.  The same pattern would apply to the expected real 
rate of return on short-term bills—the type of claim considered in Table 5—if we 
introduce a constant probability of default or, for nominal claims, a time-invariant 
process for inflation. 
  Observed returns on short-term bills do not conform to these predictions.  
Table 15 shows means and medians for real bill returns during the C and GDP crises 
shown in Tables 6 and 8.  (The bill returns for each crisis are mean values from the peak 
year to one year prior to the trough year.)  These results apply to the main samples (87 C 
crises and 148 GDP crises) when data are also available on bill returns (53 for C and 69 
for GDP).  The average real bill return during crises was between -3% and -6% per year, 
depending on whether we use a C or GDP sample and on whether we consider the mean 
or the median.  Hence, the average crisis return was well below the long-term average of 
around 1% shown in Table 5. 
  There are two main issues to consider.  The first is whether a substantially 
negative number, such as -3% to -6% per year, is a good measure of expected real bill 
returns during crises.  A major question here concerns inflation.  The second is whether 
our analysis of the equity premium would be much affected if the expected real return on 
bills during crises were substantially negative.  Since the second issue is more 
fundamental, and we think the answer is no, we consider that question first. 
  One possible reason for a low equilibrium real bill return during crises is that the 
disaster probability, p, is unusually high.  In this case, the risk-free rate and the expected   37
real bill return would be unusually low in crises.  However, the key issue for the equity 
premium is not the level of the equilibrium bill return during crises (caused by a high p or 
some other factor) but, rather, whether the incidence of a crisis imposes substantial real 
capital losses on bills.  Recall that bills correspond, empirically, to claims with maturity 
of three months or less.  Although the crisis induced changes in the real value of these 
claims are hard to measure accurately, substantial real capital losses can arise only if 
there are jumps in the price level or literal defaults on bills.  Absent these effects, the 
pricing of bills in normal times (and, hence, the equity premium) would not be much 
influenced by the prospect of low equilibrium real bill returns during crises.
21  In contrast, 
for long-term bonds, the real capital losses at the onsets of crises could be substantial and 
would have to be compared with those on stocks.  Thus, it would be useful to analyze the 
crisis experiences of the 10-year government bonds included in Table 5.  However, the 
measurement of crisis-induced real capital losses on these bonds will be challenging. 
  A different point is that the computed averages of real bill returns during crises 
may understate expected real returns because of influences from inflation.  Crises do 
feature higher than usual inflation rates—the median inflation rates were 5.9% for C 
crises and 6.9% for GDP crises, compared to 4.5% for long samples for all countries 
taken together.  (The inflation rate for each crisis in Tables 6 and 8 is the mean value 
from the peak year to one year prior to the trough year.)  Hence, one possible explanation 
for the low average real bill return during crises is that the greater incidence of high 
inflation corresponds to high unanticipated inflation and, thereby, to a shortfall of 
                                                 
21An analogous result holds for paper currency.  The expected real return on currency would be low during 
a crisis if the expected inflation rate were high.  However—absent jumps in the price level or literal 
defaults–currency held in normal times would still provide good protection against stock-market crashes 
associated with crises.   38
realized real returns on nominally denominated bills from expected returns.  A 
shortcoming of this argument is that it requires inflation to be systematically 
underestimated during crises (which are presumably recognized contemporaneously). 
  A second possibility is that the reported nominal yields at times of high inflation 
systematically understate the true nominal returns and, therefore, lead to under-estimates 
of real returns.  The reason is the understatement of the implications of compounding for 
calculating true nominal returns.
22  We think that this issue is quantitatively important, 
and we are attempting to improve our calculations in this regard. 
  
X.  Plans 
  We plan to expand the 22-country sample for consumer expenditure and the 
35-country sample for GDP.  Promising candidates are Mexico, with gaps from 1911 to 
1920, and Malaysia and South Korea, with gaps around WWII.  Also promising are 
Russia back to the pre-WWI Tsarist period and Turkey/Ottoman Empire, for which we 
currently have data since 1923.  We are considering Ireland, particularly whether we can 
separate Irish macroeconomic variables from U.K. statistics for the period prior to Irish 
independence in 1922.  We plan also to reexamine the pre-1929 U.S. data, focusing on 
the Civil War years. 
                                                 
22As an example, Peru’s crisis in 1987-92 featured very high inflation.  In 1989, the price level increased by 
a factor of 29.  The IMF’s International Financial Statistics reports, on a monthly basis, nominal deposit 
yields for 1989 averaging 1100% per year.  The IFS people tell us that an annual rate of 1100% means that 
the nominal value of funds held as deposits would rise over a year by a factor of 12.  This nominal return, 
in conjunction with the inflation experience, produces a real rate of return for Peru in 1989 of -0.58 per year.  
Suppose, alternatively, that a nominal yield of 1100% per year means that returns are compounded monthly 
at a rate of 92% (=1100%/12) per month.  In this case, the nominal value would rise over a year by a factor 
of 2500, implying an astronomically positive real rate of return.  The point is that, when the inflation rate is 
high, compounding errors of this type have large implications for calculated real rates of return—and we 
think that these errors are regularly in the direction of understating true returns.   39
  We will try to go further in measuring the division of personal consumer 
expenditure between durables versus non-durables and services.  Table 10 shows the data 
that we have been able to compile, thus far, for crisis periods.  These data cover 28 of the 
C crises contained in Table 6—18 of the 28 are in our main sample of 87 events.  We 
may also attempt to add data on government consumption.  A key issue here is the 
separation of military outlays from other forms of government consumption expenditure. 
  We plan to construct time series for C and GDP per capita at the levels of regions 
that include multiple countries—such as the OECD, Western Europe, Latin America, 
Asia, the “world,” and so on.  These regional aggregates can be relevant when countries 
are integrated through financial and other markets.  There are tricky aspects of this 
exercise involving changes in country borders, and we are working on this issue.  Once 
we have these super-aggregate variables, we will examine C and GDP crises at regional 
levels. 
  In joint work with Rustam Ibragimov, we will use the method of Gabaix and 
Ibragimov (2007) to estimate the distribution of disaster sizes, b, within a power-law 
context.  Preliminary analysis shows good results when treating (1-b)
-γ as subject to a 
power-law cumulative density with exponent α.  With these results, we can compute the 
key expectations in the model, such as E (1-b)
-γ, in closed form (as functions of γ and α).  
We can also redo the simulation of the model using the fitted density function for b, 
rather than the observed histogram. 
  We are working with Emi Nakamura and Jón Steinsson on a formal statistical 
model of the evolution of per capita consumer expenditure and GDP.  We will use the 
full time series on C and GDP to estimate disaster probability (possibly time varying),   40
evolution of economic contractions during disaster states, probability of return to 
normalcy, and long-run effects from disasters on levels and growth rates of C and GDP.  
We will also allow for trend breaks in growth rates, as well as for some differences in 
uncertainty parameters across countries and over time. 
  We are working with Emmanuel Farhi and Xavier Gabaix on a different approach 
to measuring time-varying disaster probabilities.  Our plan is to use U.S. data since the 
early 1980s on prices of stock-index options to gauge changing market perceptions of the 
likelihood of substantial adverse shocks.  Aside from considering the equity premium, we 
will apply this analysis to real rates of return on bonds in normal times and during crises. 
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Table 1  Starting Dates for Consumer Expenditure and GDP 
Part 1:  OECD Countries 
Country  Starting Dates  Missing Values 
 C  GDP  C  GDP 
Australia  1901 1820     
Austria  1913* 1870  1919-23,  1945-46   
Belgium  1913 1846     
Canada  1871 1870     
Denmark  1844 1818     
Finland  1860 1860     
France  1824 1820     
Germany  1851 1851     
Greece  1938* 1833**    1944 
Iceland  1945* 1870     
Italy  1861 1861     
Japan  1874 1870     
Netherlands  1814 1807     
New Zealand  1939* 1870  1940-43,  1945-46   
Norway  1830 1830     
Portugal  1910 1865     
Spain  1850 1850     
Sweden  1800 1800     
Switzerland  1851 1851     
U.K.  1830 1830     
U.S.  1834 1790  1860-68  1860-68? 
 
   45
 
Part 2:  Non-OECD Countries 
Country  Starting Dates  Missing Values 
 C  GDP  C  GDP 
Argentina  1875 1875     
Brazil  1901 1850     
Chile  1900 1900     
Colombia  1925* 1905     
India  1919* 1872     
Indonesia  1960* 1880     
Malaysia  1900* 1900† 1940-46  1943-46 
Mexico  1920* 1895†    1910-19? 
Peru  1896 1896     
Philippines  1950* 1902††    1941-45 
Singapore  1900* 1900† 1940-47  1940-49 
South Africa  1946* 1911     
South Korea  1911* 1911 1941-52   
Sri Lanka  1960* 1870     
Taiwan  1901 1901     
Turkey  1923* 1923†     
Uruguay  1960* 1870     
Venezuela  1923* 1883     
 
 
Note:  C represents real per capita personal consumer expenditure.  GDP represents real 
per capita GDP.  Missing values apply to period between country starting date and 2006.  
OECD is defined to exclude recent members and Turkey.  Criterion for inclusion in 
samples is presence of continuous data back before World War I. 
 
*Excluded from analysis for C sample because of insufficient coverage. 
†Excluded from analysis for GDP sample because of insufficient coverage. 
**Greece is included in the GDP sample with data for log(GDP) in 1944 interpolated 
between values for 1943 and 1945. 
††The Philippines is included in part of the analysis of GDP data despite the gap in 
information for 1941-45.  This gap does not prevent our estimating the cumulative 
contraction in GDP associated with World War II.   46
 
Table 2  Growth Rates of Consumer Expenditure and GDP 
Means and Standard Deviations by Country (since 1870 or later) 
  C GDP 
  mean s.d. mean s.d. 
Part 1:  OECD countries 
Australia  0.0154 0.0506 0.0159 0.0423 
Austria  -- --  0.0217  0.0709 
Belgium  0.0189 0.0904 0.0203 0.0838 
Canada  0.0192 0.0474 0.0212 0.0511 
Denmark  0.0163 0.0538 0.0190 0.0370 
Finland  0.0239 0.0568 0.0237 0.0449 
France  0.0162 0.0674 0.0191 0.0642 
Germany  0.0189 0.0570 0.0212 0.0811 
Greece  -- --  0.0210  0.1013 
Iceland  -- --  0.0254  0.0506 
Italy  0.0173 0.0370 0.0213 0.0471 
Japan  0.0261 0.0704 0.0277 0.0611 
Netherlands  0.0190 0.0854 0.0188 0.0757 
New Zealand  -- --  0.0143  0.0517 
Norway  0.0194 0.0380 0.0231 0.0361 
Portugal  0.0272 0.0448 0.0207 0.0431 
Spain  0.0204 0.0727 0.0200 0.0453 
Sweden  0.0208 0.0458 0.0230 0.0362 
Switzerland  0.0150 0.0623 0.0150 0.0399 
U.K.  0.0147 0.0283 0.0157 0.0293 
U.S.  0.0185 0.0360 0.0217 0.0498 
Part 2:  Non-OECD countries 
Argentina  0.0189 0.0823 0.0164 0.0674 
Brazil  0.0277 0.0780 0.0192 0.0507 
Chile  0.0191 0.0905 0.0209 0.0620 
Colombia  -- --  0.0236  0.0229 
India  -- --  0.0140  0.0487 
Indonesia  -- --  0.0160  0.0556 
Peru  0.0174 0.0463 0.0207 0.0482 
South Africa  -- --  0.0130  0.0485 
South Korea  -- --  0.0352  0.0743 
Sri Lanka  -- --  0.0144  0.0455 
Taiwan  0.0344 0.0872 0.0386 0.0807 
Uruguay  -- --  0.0143  0.0787 
Venezuela  -- --  0.0251  0.0893 
 
Note:  Growth rates are for real per capita personal consumer expenditure, C, and real per capita 
GDP.  Countries included are those with full data from before World War I, as indicated in 
Table 1.  Periods are from 1870 (or the later starting date with available data) through 2006.   47
 
Table 3  Growth Rates of Consumer Expenditure and GDP 
Means across Countries, Various Periods 

















OECD           
  1870-1913*  15 0.0139  0.0411  21 0.0141  0.0373 
  1914-1947  15 0.0111  0.0871  21 0.0147  0.0887 
  1948-2006  15 0.0266  0.0259  21 0.0287  0.0284 
  1870-2006*  15 0.0188  0.0541  21 0.0205  0.0544 
non-OECD           
  1870-1913*  5 0.0232  0.0874  10  0.0166  0.0682 
  1914-1947  5 0.0139  0.0868  10  0.0131  0.0724 
  1948-2006  5 0.0275  0.0577  10  0.0259  0.0448 
  1870-2006*  5 0.0235  0.0769  10  0.0199  0.0624 
All countries           
  1870-1913*  20 0.0162  0.0527  31 0.0149  0.0473 
  1914-1947  20 0.0118  0.0870  31 0.0141  0.0834 
  1948-2006  20 0.0268  0.0339  31 0.0278  0.0337 
  1870-2006*  20 0.0200  0.0598  31 0.0203  0.0570 
 
 
*Sample limited to countries from Tables 1 and 2 with data on growth rates from 1904 or 
earlier (so that each country has at least ten observations for 1870-1913). 
 
Note:  Growth rates are for real per capita personal consumer expenditure, C, and real per capita 
GDP.  The means are for countries with available data in each sample for growth rates and 
standard deviations.    48
 
Table 4  Starting Dates for Real Rates of Return 
Part 1:  OECD Countries 
Country Stocks  Bills  Bonds 
  Total Returns  Stock Indexes     
Australia  1883 1876  1862*  1862* 
Austria  1970  1923 [1939-44]  1885* [1938-44]  1946 
Belgium  1951  1898 [1914-18,  
1940, 1944-46] 
1849 [1945-46]  1836* [1945-46] 
Canada  1934 1916  1903  [1914-34]  1880* 
Denmark  1970 1915  1864  1822 
Finland  1962 1923  1915*  1960 
France  1896 [1940-41]  1857 [1940-41]  1841*  1841* 
Germany  1870 [1917-23]  1841  1854  1924 
Greece  1977  1929 [1941-52]  1915* [1944-45]  1993 
Iceland  2003  1993  1988 [2004-07]  1993 [2004-07] 
Italy  1925 1906  1868  1862 
Japan  1921 1894  1883  1871 
Netherlands  1951 1920  [1945-46]  1881*  1881* 
New Zealand  1987 1927  1923  1926 
Norway  1970 1915  1819  1877 
Portugal  1989 1932  [1975-77]  1930*  1976 
Spain  1941 1875  [1936-40]  1883  1941 
Sweden  1919 1902  1857  1922 
Switzerland  1967 1911  [1914-16]  1895  1916 
U.K.†  1791 1791  1801  1791 
U.S.  1801 1801  1836  1801 
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Part 2:  Non-OECD Countries 
Country Stocks  Bills  Bonds 
  Total Returns  Stock Indexes     
Argentina  1988 1939  [1958-66]  1978  -- 
Brazil  1988 1955  1995  -- 
Chile  1983 1895  1925  -- 
Colombia  1988 1928  1986  -- 
India  1988 1921  [1926-27]  1874  1874* 
Indonesia  1988 1925  [1940-77]  1970  -- 
Malaysia  1973 1974  1960  1961 
Mexico  1988 1930  1962  1995 
Peru  1993 1927  1985  -- 
Philippines  1982 1953  1950  1997 
Singapore  1970 1966  1960  1988 
South Africa  1961 1911  1936  1896 
South Korea  1963 1963  1951  1957 
Sri Lanka  1993 1953  [1975-84]  1951  -- 
Taiwan  1988 1968  1962  1990 
Turkey  1987 1987  1973  1996 
Uruguay  -- **  --  -- 
Venezuela  1988 1930††  1948  1984 
 
 
Note:  Years in brackets are missing data.  Rates of return are computed on an arithmetic 
basis using end-of-year values of total-return indexes divided by consumer price indexes.  
Stock returns computed from stock-price indexes include rough estimates of dividend 
yields (or use actual dividend yields in a few cases).  Bill returns are from short-term 
government bills (maturity of three months or less) or, in some cases, for overnight rates, 
deposit rates, or central bank discount rates.  Bond returns are typically for 10-year 
government bonds but sometimes for other maturities.  Data are mostly from Global 
Financial Data.  Stock-price indexes for Japan 1893-1914 are from Fujino and Akiyama 
(1977).  Bill data for Colombia, Indonesia, and Peru are from IMF.  In some cases, CPI 
data come from sources other than Global Financial Data. 
 
*Starting date limited by missing CPI data. 
**Uruguay has stock-price data starting in 1925 but no estimates of dividend yields. 
†U.K. data before 1790 were not used.  U.K. bond data are for consols up to 1932 and 
10-year government bonds thereafter. 
††January 1942 stock-price index used to approximate year-end value for 1941. 
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Table 5  Long-Period Averages of Rates of Return 
Country Start  Stocks  Bills  Start  Bonds  Bills 
Part 1:  OECD countries 
Australia  1876  0.1027 (0.1616)  0.0126 (0.0566)  1870  0.0352 (0.1157)  0.0125 (0.0569) 
Belgium  --  --  --  1870  0.0291 (0.1584)**  0.0179 (0.1447)** 
Canada  1916  0.0781 (0.1754)  --  1916  0.0392 (0.1199)  -- 
Denmark  1915  0.0750 (0.2300)  0.0265 (0.0652)  1870  0.0392 (0.1137)  0.0317 (0.0588) 
Finland  1923  0.1268 (0.3155)  0.0128 (0.0935)  --  --  -- 
France  1870  0.0543 (0.2078)*  -0.0061 (0.0996)*  1870  0.0066 (0.1368)  -0.0079 (0.1000) 
Germany  1870  0.0758 (0.2976)  -0.0153 (0.1788)  1924  0.0402 (0.1465)  0.0158 (0.1173) 
Italy  1906  0.0510 (0.2760)  -0.0112 (0.1328)  1870  0.0173 (0.1879)  0.0046 (0.1191) 
Japan  1894  0.0928 (0.3017)  -0.0052 (0.1370)  1883  0.0192 (0.1820)  0.0043 (0.1475) 
Netherlands  1920  0.0901 (0.2116)**  0.0114 (0.0474)**  1881  0.0308 (0.1067)  0.0118 (0.0512) 
New Zealand  1927  0.0762 (0.2226)  0.0234 (0.0529)  1926  0.0276 (0.1209)  0.0240 (0.0529) 
Norway  1915  0.0716 (0.2842)  0.0098 (0.0782)  1877  0.0280 (0.1130)  0.0204 (0.0709) 
Spain  1883  0.0610 (0.2075)†  0.0173 (0.0573)†  --  --  -- 
Sweden  1902  0.0923 (0.2347)  0.0180 (0.0719)  1922  0.0292 (0.0941)  0.0176 (0.0448) 
Switzerland  1911  0.0726 (0.2107)††  0.0083 (0.0531)††  1916  0.0218 (0.0717)  0.0065 (0.0545) 
U.K.  1870  0.0641 (0.1765)  0.0179 (0.0624)  1870  0.0280 (0.1049)  0.0179 (0.0624) 
U.S.  1870  0.0827 (0.1866)  0.0199 (0.0482)  1870  0.0271 (0.0842)  0.0199 (0.0482) 
Part 2:  Non-OECD countries 
Chile  1925  0.1689 (0.4590)  -0.0302 (0.1918)  --  --  -- 
India  1921  0.0514 (0.2341)***  0.0133 (0.0835)***  1874  0.0191 (0.1147)  0.0240 (0.0785) 
South Africa  1911  0.0890 (0.2006)  --  1911  0.0248 (0.1165)  -- 
Overall means†††  --  0.0829 (0.248)  0.0072 (0.089)  --  0.0266 (0.131)  0.0147 (0.081) 
 
*missing 1940-41, **missing 1945-46, †missing 1936-40, ††missing 1914-16, ***missing 1926-27 
†††Averages of means and standard deviations for 17 countries with stock and bill data and 15 countries with bond and bill data 
 
Notes:  See notes to Table 4.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Columns for stocks and bills are for common samples with the indicated 
starting date.  Columns for bonds and bills are for common samples with the indicated starting date.  End dates are 2006.  51
 
Table 6  Consumption Disasters 
Part 1:  OECD countries 










Australia  1918 1913  0.238  0.144  -0.008  0.036 
  1932 1927  0.234  0.069  0.086  -0.032 
 1944  1938 0.301  0.225  -0.024  0.041 
Austria (X)  1918  1913 0.451  --  0.034  0.019 
  1933 1929  0.217  0.533  0.071  -0.004 
 1947?  1938 0.438?  --  --  -- 
Belgium 1917  1913 0.445  --  -0.160  0.353 
 1942  1937 0.530    -0.024  0.034 
Canada  1876 1873  0.152  --  --  -0.023 
  1908 1906  0.113  --  0.014  -0.046 
 1915  1912 0.130  --  0.022†  0.034 
  1921 1918  0.196  0.210  --  0.104 
  1933 1929  0.230  0.650  --  -0.054 
Denmark  1921 1919  0.241  0.502  -0.113  0.201 
 1941  1939 0.261  0.336  -0.120  0.193 
  1948 1946  0.144  0.040  0.005  0.025 
Finland  1892 1890  0.102  --  --  -- 
 1918  1913 0.360  --  -0.194††  0.389†† 
  1932 1928  0.199  0.207  0.115  -0.041 
 1944  1938 0.254  0.168  -0.067  0.122 
  1993 1989  0.140  0.620  0.092  0.045 
France 1871  1864 0.158  0.212  0.027  0.007 
 1915  1912 0.215  0.171  0.031  0.006 
 1943  1938 0.580  --  -0.121  0.162 
Germany 1918  1912 0.425  0.539  -0.101  0.186 
  1923 1922  0.127  0.654  -0.970  34.5 
  1932 1928  0.121  0.562  0.109  -0.035 
 1945  1939 0.412  -0.366  0.000  0.020 
Greece (X)  1944  1938 0.636  0.442*  -0.442  4.65 
 1946  1945 0.113  --  --  -- 
Iceland (X)  1952 1947  0.250  --  --  0.202 
  1969 1967  0.118  --  --  0.108 
  1975 1974  0.107  --  --  0.515 
  1993 1987  0.176  --  0.060^  0.144 
Italy 1945  1939 0.286  0.429  -0.236  1.02 
Japan 1945  1937 0.639  0.457  -0.066  0.101 
Netherlands  1893 1889  0.098  --  -0.013  0.038 
 1918  1912 0.440  --  -0.013  0.060 
 1944  1939 0.545  -0.506  -0.050  0.069   52
New Zealand (X)  1944  1939 0.224  0.089  -0.009  0.031 
Norway 1918  1916 0.169  -0.035  -0.212  0.326 
  1921 1919  0.161  0.536  -0.032  0.094 
 1944  1939 0.100  -0.222  -0.062  0.090 
Portugal  1919 1913  0.215  --  --  -- 
  1936 1934  0.121  -0.434  0.044  0.010 
  1942 1939  0.104  0.084  -0.058  0.110 
  1976 1974  0.098  --  -0.136  0.242 
Spain  1896 1892  0.182  -0.088  0.079  -0.024 
  1915 1913  0.128  0.065  0.021  0.026 
  1930 1929  0.101  0.090  0.027  0.028 
 1937  1935 0.461  0.238**  -0.051  0.058 
  1945 1940  0.145  -0.079  -0.021  0.107 
  1949 1946  0.131  0.014  -0.029  0.075 
Sweden  1917 1913  0.115  0.095  -0.014  0.074 
  1921 1920  0.132  0.251  0.052  0.019 
  1945 1939  0.182  0.173  -0.030  0.059 
Switzerland  1872 1870  0.190  --  --  -- 
  1878 1876  0.225  --  --  -- 
  1883 1881  0.142  --  --  -0.018 
  1886 1885  0.141  --  --  -0.059 
  1888 1887  0.157  --  --  0.010 
  1918 1912  0.108  0.475  -0.031  0.088 
  1945 1939  0.173  0.382  -0.052  0.074 
U.K. 1918  1915 0.167  0.490  -0.117  0.188 
 1943  1938 0.169  0.123  -0.032  0.047 
U.S.  1921 1917  0.164  0.584  -0.071  0.139 
 1933  1929  0.208  0.631  0.093  -0.064 
 
*1937-40, **1934-35, †1913-14, ††1915-17, ^1988-92 
X:  Not in analysis for C sample.   53
 
 
Table 6, Part 2:  Non-OECD countries 










Argentina  1891 1887  0.123  --  --  0.080 
  1898 1895  0.283  --  --  0.030 
  1900 1899  0.195  --  --  -0.096 
  1902 1901  0.127  --  --  0.059 
  1907 1906  0.123  --  --  0.025 
  1917 1912  0.172  --  --  0.047 
  1932 1928  0.189  --  --  -0.028 
  1959 1958  0.101  --  --  0.507 
 1982  1980 0.104  0.575  0.516  1.09 
  1990 1987  0.160  -3.264  -0.249  18.3 
  2002 1998  0.249  0.401  0.090  -0.009 
Brazil  1905 1902  0.148  --  --  -0.029 
  1909 1906  0.157  --  --  0.023 
  1919 1918  0.109  --  --  0.123 
  1921 1920  0.147  --  --  0.099 
  1931 1928  0.201  --  --  -0.037 
  1990 1984  0.163  -0.271  --  6.42 
Chile  1915 1911  0.322  -0.021  --  0.030 
  1922 1918  0.181  0.154  --  0.085 
  1932 1929  0.374  0.538  0.063  0.007 
  1956 1954  0.136  -0.315  -0.410  0.774 
 1976  1972 0.401  -2.470  -0.516 3.47 
  1985 1981  0.327  0.684  0.165  0.191 
Colombia (X)  1932 1929  0.181  0.263  --  -0.090 
  1943 1939  0.228  -0.053  --  0.041 
  1999 1997  0.099  0.043  0.095  0.172 
India (X)  1942  1932 0.217  -0.814  0.003 0.016 
 1946  1943 0.130  -0.305  -0.053 0.086 
  1950 1947  0.177  0.504  -0.025  0.038 
Malaysia (X)  1916 1914  0.096  --  --  -- 
  1920 1917  0.425  --  --  -- 
  1932 1929  0.258  --  --  -- 
 1947?  1938 0.336?  --  --  -- 
  1952 1951  0.118  --  --  0.164 
  1986 1984  0.145  0.434  0.036  0.014 
  1998 1997  0.124  0.533  0.036  0.029 
Mexico (X)  1932 1926  0.317  0.406*  --  -0.025 
  1988 1981  0.161  -0.148  0.024  0.852 
  1995 1994  0.113  0.147  0.075  0.071   54
Peru  1914 1907  0.118  --  --  -- 
  1932 1929  0.140  0.105  --  -0.043 
  1979 1975  0.179  0.325  --  0.437 
  1992 1987  0.300  0.519  -0.522  24.8 
Singapore (X)  1916 1910  0.145  --  --  -- 
  1920 1918  0.127  --  --  -- 
  1931 1928  0.104  --  --  -- 
  1951 1949  0.159  --  --  0.098 
  1959 1956  0.117  --  --  0.013 
South Korea (X)  1998 1997  0.143  0.458  0.072  0.066 
Taiwan 1905  1903 0.219  --  --  0.076 
  1911 1910  0.127  --  --  0.082 
 1945  1936 0.684  --  --  0.148 
Turkey (X)  1932 1929  0.120  --  --  -0.031 
  1946 1938  0.298  --  --  0.215 
  2001 2000  0.108  0.565  -0.078  0.390 
Uruguay (X)  1965 1960  0.099  --  --  0.274 
  1984 1981  0.267  --  --  0.338 
  2002 1998  0.219  --  --  0.054 
Venezuela (X)  1933 1930  0.311  0.074  --  -0.060 
  1936 1935  0.107  -0.069  --  -0.058 
  1952 1948  0.203  0.103  -0.025  0.048 
 1964  1957  0.223  0.329  0.020  0.016 
 1989  1982  0.320  -3.493  -0.048  0.183 
 2003  1993  0.147  0.690  -0.043  0.421 
 
*1929-31 
X:  Not in analysis for C sample. 
 
Note:  Declines of real per capita personal consumer expenditure, C, by 0.1 or greater are 
cumulative fractions from peak year to trough year.  Declines of real stock prices are 
cumulative fractions from the end of the year prior to the peak to the end of the year prior 
to the trough (unless the timing is indicated otherwise because of missing data).  A 
negative number means that real stock prices increased.  Real rates of return on bills and 
inflation rates are mean values from the peak year to one year prior to the trough year 
(unless the timing is indicated otherwise because of missing data).  Bold for trough year 








OECD (11).  Canada 2 (0.15, 0.11), Finland (0.10), France (0.16), Netherlands (0.10), 
Spain (0.18), Switzerland 5 (0.19, 0.22, 0.14, 0.14, 0.16). 
 
Non-OECD (10).  Argentina 5 (0.12, 0.28, 0.20, 0.13, 0.12), Brazil 2 (0.15, 0.16), Peru 
(0.12), Taiwan 2 (0.22, 0.13). 
 
World War I (includes non-combatants) (19) 
 
OECD (14).  Australia (0.24), Austria (0.45), Belgium (0.45), Canada (0.13), Finland 
(0.36), France (0.22), Germany (0.42), Netherlands (0.44), Norway (0.17), Portugal 
(0.22), Spain (0.13), Sweden (0.12), Switzerland (0.11), U.K. (0.17). 
 





OECD (6).  Canada (0.20), Denmark (0.24), Germany (0.13), Norway (0.16), Sweden 
(0.13), U.S. (0.16). 
 
Non-OECD (4).  Brazil (0.15), Chile (0.18), Malaysia (0.42), Singapore (0.13). 
 
Great Depression (early 1930s) (18) 
 
OECD (7).  Australia (0.23), Austria (0.22), Canada (0.23), Finland (0.20), Germany 
(0.12), Spain (0.10), U.S. (0.21). 
 
Non-OECD (11).  Argentina (0.19), Brazil (0.20), Chile (0.37), Colombia (0.18), India 
(0.22), Malaysia (0.26), Mexico (0.32), Peru (0.14), Singapore (0.10), Turkey (0.12), 
Venezuela (0.31). 
 
Spanish Civil War (includes non-combatant) (2) 
 
OECD (2).  Portugal (0.12), Spain (0.46). 
 
Late 1930s (1) 
 
Non-OECD (1).  Venezuela (0.11). 
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World War II (includes non-combatants) (22) 
 
OECD (17).  Australia (0.30), Austria (0.44), Belgium (0.53), Denmark (0.26), Finland 
(0.25), France (0.58), Germany (0.41), Greece (0.64), Italy (0.29), Japan (0.64), 
Netherlands (0.54), Norway (0.10), Portugal (0.10), Spain (0.14), Sweden (0.18), 
Switzerland (0.17), U.K. (0.17). 
 





OECD (9).  Denmark (0.14), Finland (0.14), Greece (0.11), Iceland 4 (0.25, 0.12, 0.11, 
0.18), Portugal (0.10), Spain (0.13). 
 
Non-OECD (28).  Argentina 4 (0.10, 0.10, 0.16, 0.25), Brazil (0.16), Chile 3 (0.14, 0.40, 
0.33), Colombia (0.10), India (0.18), Malaysia 3 (0.12, 0.14, 0.12), Mexico 2 (0.16, 0.11), 
Peru 2 (0.18, 0.30), Singapore 2 (0.16, 0.12), South Korea (0.14), Turkey (0.11), 
Uruguay 3 (0.10, 0.27, 0.22), Venezuela 4 (0.20, 0.22, 0.32, 0.15). 
 
 
Note:  Numbers in parentheses show fractional declines in C during each crisis.  57
 
 
Table 8  GDP Disasters 
Part 1:  OECD countries 










Australia  1895 1889  0.271  0.067  0.085  -0.050 
  1918 1910  0.118  0.188  -0.020  0.045 
  1931 1926  0.221  0.179  0.061  -0.013 
 1946  1943 0.145  -0.167  0.007  0.005 
Austria 1918  1912 0.381  --  0.031  0.022 
  1933 1929  0.235  0.533  0.071  -0.004 
 1945  1941 0.587  --  --  -- 
Belgium 1918  1913 0.477  --  -0.225  0.492 
  1934 1930  0.117  0.451  0.070  -0.052 
 1943  1937 0.453  -0.764 -0.033  0.045 
Canada  1878 1874  0.117  --  --  -0.020 
  1921 1917  0.301  0.393  --  0.115 
  1933 1928  0.348  0.558  --  -0.041 
Denmark 1918  1914 0.160  0.132* -0.045  0.128 
 1941  1939 0.239  0.336  -0.120  0.193 
Finland  1881 1876  0.120  --  --  -- 
 1918  1913 0.353  --  -0.194††  0.389†† 
 1940  1938 0.103  0.142  0.017  0.024 
  1993 1989  0.124  0.620  0.092  0.045 
France 1870  1868 0.095  --  --  -0.011 
  1879 1874  0.102  --  --  -0.002 
  1886 1882  0.133  0.296  0.028  0.000 
 1918  1912 0.289  0.395  -0.055  0.117 
  1935 1929  0.187  0.535  0.068  -0.039 
 1944  1939 0.414  --  -0.147  0.197 
Germany 1919  1913 0.357  0.736  -0.125  0.214 
  1923 1922  0.135  0.654  -0.970  34.5 
  1932 1928  0.280  0.562  0.109  -0.035 
 1946  1943 0.736  0.068  -0.009  0.028 
Greece  1872 1868  0.106  --  --  -- 
  1877 1873  0.152  --  --  -- 
  1891 1888  0.233  --  --  -- 
 1897  1896 0.151  --  --  -- 
  1901 1899  0.144  --  --  -- 
 1913  1911 0.419  --  --  -- 
 1919  1918 0.177  --  -0.553 1.38 
 1923  1921 0.238  --  -0.203  0.369 
 1942  1939 0.660  0.448**  -0.331 4.31   58
Iceland  1883 1881  0.125  --  --  -- 
  1918 1913  0.221  --  --  0.206 
  1920 1919  0.157  --  --  0.114 
  1952 1948  0.139  --  --  0.235 
Italy  1920 1918  0.221  0.374  -0.101  0.195 
 1945  1939 0.413  0.429  -0.236 1.02 
Japan 1944  1940 0.503  0.239  -0.026  0.054 
Netherlands 1918  1913 0.258  --  -0.021  0.070 
  1934 1929  0.129  0.582  0.057  -0.032 
 1944  1939 0.525  -0.506 -0.050  0.069 
New Zealand  1879 1878  0.174  --  --  -- 
  1909 1907  0.110  --  --  -- 
  1918 1911  0.107  --  --  0.040 
  1927 1925  0.117  --  0.057  0.009 
  1948 1947  0.119  0.003  -0.061  0.081 
  1951 1950  0.097  -0.049  -0.068  0.089 
Norway 1918  1916 0.148  -0.035 -0.212  0.326 
  1921 1920  0.110  0.447  -0.117  0.194 
 1944  1939 0.193  -0.222 -0.062  0.090 
Portugal  1928 1927  0.109  --  --  -- 
  1936 1934  0.148  -0.434  0.044  0.010 
Spain  1896 1892  0.119  -0.088  0.079  -0.024 
  1933 1929  0.096  0.464  0.061  -0.009 
 1938  1935 0.313  0.238† -0.035  0.098 
Sweden  1918 1916  0.150  0.169  -0.185  0.323 
  1921 1920  0.108  0.251  0.052  0.019 
  1941 1939  0.095  0.349  -0.071  0.104 
Switzerland  1879 1875  0.161  --  --  -- 
  1918 1912  0.191  0.475  -0.031  0.088 
  1942 1939  0.126  0.308  -0.080  0.105 
U.K.  1921 1918  0.192  0.321  -0.069  0.130 
  1947 1943  0.148  -0.269  0.003  0.006 
U.S.  1908 1906  0.105  0.365  0.019  0.041 
  1914 1913  0.095  0.160  0.034  0.020 
  1921 1918  0.118  0.293  -0.057  0.125 
 1933  1929  0.290  0.631  0.093  -0.064 
 1947  1944  0.165  -0.061  -0.062  0.076 
 
*1914-17, **1938-40, †1934-35, ††1915-17 
X:  Not in analysis for GDP sample.   59
 
Table 8, Part 2:  Non-OECD countries 










Argentina  1891 1889  0.189  --  --  0.284 
  1897 1896  0.219  --  --  0.069 
  1900 1899  0.147  --  --  -0.096 
  1917 1912  0.289  --  --  0.047 
  1932 1929  0.195  --  --  -0.002 
  1959 1958  0.101  --  --  0.507 
 1982  1980 0.111  0.575 0.516  1.09 
  1990 1988  0.141  -3.430  -0.355  26.6 
  2002 1998  0.220  0.401  0.090 -0.009 
Brazil  1887 1884  0.105  --  --  -0.020 
  1893 1891  0.262  --  --  0.248 
  1900 1895  0.135  --  --  0.033 
  1931 1928  0.201  --  --  -0.037 
  1992 1987  0.110  0.358  --  10.8 
Chile  1903 1902  0.111  0.115  --  0.175 
  1915 1912  0.105  0.018  --  0.026 
  1919 1918  0.126  -0.018  --  -0.014 
  1932 1929  0.361  0.538  0.063  0.007 
 1975  1971 0.240  -2.081  -0.479  2.67 
  1983 1981  0.180  0.499  0.296  0.151 
Colombia  none 
India  1877 1875  0.154  --  --  -0.065 
  1896 1894  0.100  --  0.120 -0.060 
 1918  1916 0.146  --  0.004  -0.061 
 1948  1943 0.117  0.073  -0.058  0.082 
Indonesia  1933 1930  0.114  0.406  --  -0.186 
 1945  1940 0.545  --  -- 0.044 
  1999 1997  0.158  0.681  -0.066 0.440 
Malaysia (X)  1904 1902  0.100  --  --  -- 
  1935 1929  0.193  --  --  -- 
  1937 1936  0.117  --  --  -- 
 1941  1939 0.235  --  --  -- 
 1947?  1942 0.361  --  --  -- 
Mexico (X)  1914?  1909? 0.141?  --  --  0.031 
  1932 1926  0.320  0.406*  --  -0.025 
  1988 1981  0.128  -0.148  0.024  0.852 
Peru  1932 1929  0.258  0.105  --  -0.043 
  1979 1975  0.104  0.325  --  0.437 
  1983 1981  0.136  0.879  --  0.728 
  1992 1987  0.325  0.519  -0.522  24.8   60
Philippines  1904 1903  0.158  --  --  0.234 
  1915 1913  0.116  --  --  -0.109 
  1935 1929  0.134  --  --  -0.038 
 1946  1939 0.572  --  --  -- 
  1985 1982  0.187  0.736  -0.050 0.285 
Singapore (X)  1904 1902  0.214  --  --  -- 
  1913 1910  0.337  --  --  -- 
  1916 1915  0.174  --  --  -- 
  1920 1917  0.235  --  --  -- 
  1927 1925  0.389  --  --  -- 
  1932 1929  0.412  --  --  -- 
  1938 1937  0.151  --  --  -- 
  1952 1950?  0.345  --  --  0.192 
  1957 1956  0.113  --  --  0.033 
South Africa  1917 1912  0.229  0.139  --  0.031 
  1920 1919  0.239  -0.200  --  0.009 
  1987 1981  0.113  -0.156  0.006  0.147 
  1993 1989  0.102  0.028  0.032  0.140 
South Korea  1919 1918  0.111  --  --  -- 
 1945  1940 0.480  --  --  -- 
 1951  1949 0.151  --  -- 0.492 
Sri Lanka  1878 1870  0.158  --  --  -- 
  1886 1883  0.141  --  --  -- 
  1923 1913  0.138  --  --  -- 
  1932 1929  0.147  --  --  -- 
 1946  1942 0.211  --  -- 0.147 
Taiwan 1905  1903 0.214  --  -- 0.076 
  1911 1910  0.114  --  --  0.082 
 1945  1936 0.662  --  -- 0.148 
Turkey (X)  1927 1926  0.134  --  --  0.033 
  1932 1931  0.122  --  --  -0.025 
  1945 1939  0.395  --  --  0.283 
Uruguay  1875 1872  0.269  --  --  -- 
  1881 1878  0.153  --  --  -- 
  1887 1886  0.140  --  --  -0.054 
  1890 1888  0.202  --  --  0.181 
  1901 1896  0.156  --  --  0.045 
  1905 1904  0.122  --  --  -0.081 
  1915 1912  0.280  --  --  0.057 
  1920 1919  0.142  --  --  0.099 
  1933 1930  0.367  --  --  -0.005 
  1943 1939  0.139  --  --  0.033 
  1959 1957  0.118  --  --  0.190 
  1984 1981  0.236  --  --  0.338 
  2002 1998  0.186  --  --  0.054   61
Venezuela  1892 1890  0.235  --  --  -- 
 1897  1893  0.225  --  --  -- 
 1907  1903  0.134  --  --  -- 
 1916  1913  0.167  --  --  0.025** 
 1933  1930  0.162  0.074  --  -0.060 
 1942  1939  0.155  -0.134  --  -0.003 
 1961  1957  0.152  0.270  0.007  0.020 
 1985  1977  0.295  0.616  -0.005  0.121 
 2003  1993  0.259  0.690  -0.043  0.421 
 
 
*1929-31, ** 1914-15 
X:  Not in analysis for GDP sample. 
 
Note:  Declines of real per capita GDP by 0.1 or greater are cumulative fractions from 
peak year to trough year.  Declines of real stock prices are cumulative fractions from the 
end of the year prior to the peak to the end of the year prior to the trough (unless the 
timing is indicated otherwise because of missing data).  A negative number means that 
real stock prices increased.  Real rates of return on bills and inflation rates are mean 
values from the peak year to one year prior to the trough year (unless the timing is 
indicated otherwise because of missing data).  Bold for trough year indicates current 
participant in external or internal war. 
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Table 9 
 




OECD (19).  Australia (0.27), Canada (0.12), Finland (0.12), France 3 (0.10, 0.10, 0.13), 
Greece 6 (0.11, 0.15, 0.23, 0.15, 0.14, 0.42), Iceland (0.12), New Zealand 2 (0.17, 0.11), 
Spain (0.12), Switzerland (0.16), U.S. 2 (0.10, 0.10). 
 
Non-OECD (27).  Argentina 3 (0.19, 0.22, 0.15), Brazil 3 (0.10, 0.26, 0.14), Chile (0.11), 
India 2 (0.15, 0.10), Malaysia (0.10), Mexico (0.14), Philippines (0.16), Singapore 2 
(0.21, 0.34), Sri Lanka 2 (0.16, 0.14), Taiwan 2 (0.21, 0.11), Uruguay 6 (0.27, 0.15, 0.14, 
0.20, 0.16, 0.12), Venezuela 3 (0.24, 0.22, 0.13). 
 
World War I (includes non-combatants) (26) 
 
OECD (14).  Australia (0.12), Austria (0.38), Belgium (0.48), Denmark (0.16), Finland 
(0.35), France (0.29), Germany (0.36), Greece (0.18), Iceland (0.22), Netherlands (0.26), 
New Zealand (0.11), Norway (0.15), Sweden (0.15), Switzerland (0.19). 
 
Non-OECD (12).  Argentina (0.29), Chile 2 (0.10, 0.13), India (0.15), Philippines (0.12), 
Singapore 2 (0.17, 0.24), South Africa (0.23), South Korea (0.11), Sri Lanka (0.14), 




OECD (11).  Canada (0.30), Germany (0.14), Greece (0.24), Iceland (0.16), Italy (0.22), 
New Zealand (0.12), Norway (0.11), Portugal (0.11), Sweden (0.11), U.K. (0.19), U.S. 
(0.12). 
 
Non-OECD (4).  Singapore (0.39), South Africa (0.24), Turkey (0.13), Uruguay (0.14). 
 
Great Depression (early 1930s) (22) 
 
OECD (9).  Australia (0.22), Austria (0.24), Belgium (0.12), Canada (0.35), France (0.19), 
Germany (0.28), Netherlands (0.13), Spain (0.10), U.S. (0.29). 
 
Non-OECD (13).  Argentina (0.20), Brazil (0.20), Chile (0.36), Indonesia (0.11), 
Malaysia (0.19), Mexico (0.32), Peru (0.26), Philippines (0.13), Singapore (0.41), Sri 
Lanka (0.15), Turkey (0.12), Uruguay (0.37), Venezuela (0.16). 
 
Spanish Civil War (includes non-combatant) (2) 
 
OECD (2).  Portugal (0.15), Spain (0.31). 
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Late 1930s (2) 
 
Non-OECD (2).  Malaysia (0.12), Singapore (0.15). 
 
World War II (includes non-combatants) (25) 
 
OECD (14).  Australia (0.14), Austria (0.59), Belgium (0.45), Denmark (0.24), Finland 
(0.10), France (0.41), Germany (0.74), Greece (0.66), Italy (0.41), Japan (0.50), 
Netherlands (0.52), Norway (0.19), Sweden (0.10), Switzerland (0.13). 
 
Non-OECD (11).  India (0.12), Indonesia (0.54), Malaysia 2 (0.24, 0.36), Philippines 
(0.57), South Korea (0.48), Sri Lanka (0.21), Taiwan (0.66), Turkey (0.40), Uruguay 




OECD (6).  Finland (0.12), Iceland (0.14), New Zealand 2 (0.12, 0.10), U.K. (0.15), U.S. 
(0.16). 
 
Non-OECD (24).  Argentina 4 (0.10, 0.11, 0.14, 0.22), Brazil (0.11), Chile 2 (0.24, 0.18), 
Indonesia (0.16), Mexico (0.13), Peru 3 (0.10, 0.14, 0.32), Philippines (0.19). Singapore 2 
(0.34, 0.11), South Africa 2 (0.11, 0.10), South Korea (0.15), Uruguay 3 (0.12, 0.24, 
0.19), Venezuela 3 (0.15, 0.30, 0.26). 
 
 
Note:  Numbers in parentheses show fractional declines in GDP during each crisis. 
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Table 10  Declines in Consumer Durables during Consumption Crises 
Country  Share of Durables 
in C (nominal values) 
Proportionate decline 
in real per capita: 





Canada  1933   0.054  1929   0.085 0.230  0.507  0.201 
Finland  1892 0.029 1890 0.042 0.102  0.132  0.101 
Finland  1918 0.010 1913 0.017 0.360  0.655  0.353 
Finland  1932 0.013 1928 0.030 0.199  0.636  0.182 
Finland  1944 0.019 1938 0.038 0.254  0.634  0.237 
Finland  1993   0.072  1989   0.138 0.140  0.512  0.062 
Iceland  1969   0.101  1967   0.133 0.118  0.321  0.087 
Iceland  1975   0.134  1974   0.181 0.107  0.340  0.043 
Iceland  1993   0.102  1987   0.183 0.176  0.529  0.053 
Portugal  1976   0.092  1974   0.101 0.098  0.195  0.091 
Spain  1896 0.020 1892 0.018 0.182  0.063  0.185 
Spain  1915 0.020 1913 0.034 0.128  0.405  0.109 
Spain  1930 0.045 1929 0.057 0.101  0.238  0.090 
Spain  1937 0.022 1935 0.034 0.461  0.642  0.450 
Spain  1945 0.023 1940 0.019 0.145  -0.206  0.153 
Spain  1949 0.025 1946 0.027 0.131  0.170  0.127 
U.K.  1918   0.040  1915   0.037 0.167  0.198  0.166 
U.K.  1943   0.023  1938   0.049 0.169  0.649  0.144 
U.S.  1921   0.094  1917   0.094 0.164  0.227  0.158 
U.S.  1933   0.076  1929   0.119 0.208  0.501  0.169 
non-OECD countries 
Chile  1985 0.060 1981 0.098 0.327  0.695  0.179 
Colombia  1999   0.088  1997   0.110 0.099  0.314  0.060 
Mexico  1995   0.070  1994   0.082 0.113  0.340  0.077 
South Korea  1998   0.063  1997   0.089 0.143  0.363  0.096 
Turkey  2001   0.150  2000   0.195 0.108  0.315  0.056 
Venezuela  1964   0.042  1957   0.079 0.223  0.581  0.184 
Venezuela  1989 0.047 1982 0.073 0.320  0.643  0.299 
Venezuela  2003   0.076  1993   0.081 0.147  0.478  0.105 
            
Overall means   0.058  0.080 0.183  0.396  0.151 
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Note to Table 10:  This table shows the universe of consumption crises considered in 
Table 6 for which we have been able to break down the decline in real per capita personal 
consumer expenditure, C, into durables versus non-durables and services.  The latter 
category should be closer than C to “consumption.”  We have the necessary data for 28 C 
crises (18 of which in our main sample of 87 C crises) from Table 6.  The first four 
columns show the share of nominal durables expenditure in nominal C at the trough and 
peak years of each crisis.  The last three columns show the proportionate fall in real per 
capita consumer expenditure (the number contained in Table 6), the fall in real per capita 
durables spending, and the fall in real per capita spending on non-durables and services.  
The last measure would be closer than our Table 6 measures to the decline in per capita 
consumption.   66
 
Table 11  Matched C and GDP Contractions 
Part 1:  OECD countries 
Country  C contraction  GDP contraction 
  Trough  year Size Trough  year Size 
Australia 1918  0.238  1918  0.118 
  1932 0.234 1931 0.221 
 1944  0.301  1946  0.145 
Belgium 1917  0.445  1918  0.477 
  1934 0.092 1934 0.117 
 1942  0.530  1943  0.453 
Canada  1876 0.152 1878 0.117 
  1908 0.113 1908 0.078 
  1915 0.130 1914 0.095 
  1921 0.196 1921 0.301 
  1933 0.230 1933 0.348 
Denmark 1917  0.074  1918  0.160 
  1921 0.241 1921 0.042 
 1941  0.261  1941  0.239 
  1948 0.144 1945 0.087 
Finland  1892 0.102 1892 0.075 
 1918  0.360  1918  0.353 
  1932 0.199 1932 0.062 
 1944  0.254  1940  0.103 
  1993 0.140 1993 0.124 
France 1871  0.158  1870  0.095 
  1878 0.085 1879 0.102 
  1884 0.085 1886 0.133 
 1915  0.215  1918  0.289 
  1936 0.062 1935 0.187 
 1943  0.580  1944  0.414 
Germany 1918  0.425  1919  0.357 
  1923 0.127 1923 0.135 
  1932 0.121 1932 0.280 
 1945  0.412  1946  0.736 
Italy  1919 0.026 1920 0.221 
 1945  0.286  1945  0.413 
Japan 1945  0.639  1944  0.503 
Netherlands  1893 0.098 1893 0.062 
 1918  0.440  1918  0.258 
  1935 0.045 1934 0.129 
 1944  0.545  1944  0.525 
Norway 1918  0.169  1918  0.148 
  1921 0.161 1921 0.110 
 1944  0.100  1944  0.193   67
Table 11, part 1, continued 
Country  C contraction  GDP contraction 
  Trough  year Size Trough  year Size 
Portugal  1919 0.215 1918 0.086 
  1928 0.062 1928 0.109 
  1936 0.121 1936 0.148 
  1942 0.104 1945 0.048 
  1976 0.098 1975 0.085 
Spain  1896 0.182 1896 0.119 
  1915 0.128 1918 0.038 
  1930 0.101 1933 0.096 
 1937  0.461  1938  0.313 
  1945 0.145 1945 0.084 
  1949 0.131 1949 0.013 
Sweden  1917 0.115 1918 0.150 
  1921 0.132 1921 0.108 
  1945 0.182 1941 0.095 
Switzerland  1872 0.190 1870 0.052 
  1878 0.225 1879 0.161 
  1883 0.142 1883 0.065 
  1886 0.141 1887 0.003 
  1888 0.157 1887 0.003 
  1918 0.108 1918 0.191 
  1945 0.173 1942 0.126 
U.K. 1918  0.167  1918  -0.022 
  1921 0.005 1921 0.192 
 1943  0.169  1943  -0.014 
  1948 0.001 1947 0.148 
U.S.  1908 0.037 1908 0.105 
  1915 0.046 1914 0.095 
  1921 0.164 1921 0.118 
  1933 0.208 1933 0.290 
  1947 0.001 1947 0.165 
OECD total (70) mean  0.190 0.174
OECD war (22) mean  0.329 0.284
OECD non-war (48) mean  0.127 0.123
OECD timing breakdown for trough years 
Total 70:  35 same year, 16 C later, 19 GDP later 
War 22:  10 same year, 3 C later, 9 GDP later 
Non-war 48:  25 same year, 13 C later, 10 GDP later 
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Part 2:  non-OECD countries 
Country  C contraction  GDP contraction 
  Trough year  size  Trough year  size 
Argentina  1891 0.123 1891 0.189 
  1898 0.283 1897 0.219 
  1900 0.195 1900 0.147 
  1902 0.127 1902 0.049 
  1907 0.123 1907 0.025 
  1917 0.172 1917 0.289 
  1932 0.189 1932 0.195 
  1959 0.101 1959 0.101 
 1982  0.104  1982  0.111 
  1990 0.160 1990 0.141 
  2002 0.249 2002 0.220 
Brazil  1905 0.148 1904 0.040 
  1909 0.157 1908 0.061 
  1919 0.109 1918 0.044 
  1921 0.147 1921 0.002 
  1931 0.201 1931 0.201 
  1990 0.163 1992 0.110 
Chile  1903 0.048 1903 0.111 
  1915 0.322 1915 0.105 
  1922 0.181 1919 0.126 
  1932 0.374 1932 0.361 
  1956 0.136 1956 0.038 
 1976  0.401  1975  0.240 
  1985 0.327 1983 0.180 
Peru  1914 0.118 1914 0.019 
  1932 0.140 1932 0.258 
  1979 0.179 1979 0.104 
  1983 0.075 1983 0.136 
  1992 0.300 1992 0.325 
Taiwan 1905  0.219  1905  0.214 
  1911 0.127 1911 0.114 
  1945  0.684  1945  0.662 
non-OECD total (32) mean  0.199 0.164
non-OECD war (4) mean  0.352 0.307
non-OECD non-war(28) mean  0.177 0.144
non-OECD timing breakdown for trough years 
Total 32:  24 same year, 7 C later, 1 GDP later 
War 4:  3 same year, 1 C later, 0 GDP later 
Non-war 28:  21 same year, 6 C later, 1 GDP later 
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Table 11, continued 
  C contraction  GDP contraction 
 size size
Full sample total (102) mean   0.193 0.171
Full sample war (26) mean   0.333 0.288
Full sample non-war (76) mean  0.145 0.131
full sample timing breakdown for trough years 
Total 102:  59 same year, 23 C later, 20 GDP later 
War 26:  13 same year, 4 C later, 9 GDP later 
Non-war 76:  46 same year, 19 C later, 11 GDP later 
 
 
Note:  We consider here only 17 OECD and 5 non-OECD countries that are in our full 
samples for personal consumer expenditure, C, and GDP.  Contractions in C and GDP of 
size 0.10 or more come from Tables 6 and 8 (with additions from underlying data for 
cases where C or GDP contractions were of magnitude less than 0.10).  The C and GDP 
contractions are matched by trough years (the same or nearby).  Bold for trough year 
indicates participation as combatant in war.  The timing breakdowns compare the trough 
years for C and GDP as to whether they are the same, C comes later, or GDP comes later. 
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Table 12  Simulated Model based on C Disasters (r
f=0.01 in all cases) 





p  π Eb  E(1-b)
-γ E(1-b)
1-γ ρ  ρ* r
e 
baseline (b≥0.10, γ=3.5)  87 312  0.0355 0.279 0.218  3.97  2.36  0.046 0.030  0.061
γ=3.0  87 312  0.0355 0.279 0.218  3.01  1.91  0.029 0.008  0.043
OECD  57 214  0.0286 0.266 0.223  3.87  2.37  0.034 0.007  0.048
non-OECD  30 98  0.0654 0.306 0.219  4.14  2.34  0.099 0.130  0.116
b≥0.15  54 226  0.0213 0.239 0.276  5.42  2.95  0.043 0.019  0.058
b≥0.20  32 144  0.0122 0.222 0.349  7.80  3.87  0.040 0.008  0.055
b≥0.30  17 87  0.0064 0.195 0.444  12.39  5.54  0.036 -0.003 0.052
b≥0.40  11 60  0.0041 0.183 0.506  16.90  7.07  0.034 -0.010 0.049
non-war  62 195  0.0242 0.318 0.170  2.02  1.64  0.005 -0.050 0.017
non-war, γ=9  62 195  0.0242 0.318 0.170  7.69  5.89  0.037 -0.037 0.053
HP-filtered  38 242  0.0157 0.157 0.236  3.85  2.42  0.016 -0.030 0.030




Note:  The baseline simulation uses the 87 consumption disasters of size b≥0.10 for the 22 included countries from Table 6.  The 
calibrated parameters (expected normal growth rate, g=0.025; standard deviation of normal fluctuations, σ=0.02; reciprocal of 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, θ=0.5) are discussed in the text, with the coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, set at 3.5.  For 
subsequent rows, the entry in column 1 shows how the specification differs from that for the baseline case.  Column 2 shows the 
number of disasters in the selected sample, and column 3 shows the number of disaster-years for this sample.  Column 4 shows the 
estimated probability per year, p, for moving from normalcy to disaster, and column 5 shows the estimated probability per year, π, for 
moving from disaster to normalcy.  Eb in column 6 is the mean disaster size.  E(1-b)
-γ and E(1-b)
1-γ in columns 7 and 8, respectively, 
are the mean values of these key determinants of the equity premium (from Eq. [8]).  ρ in column 9 is the rate of time preference, and 
ρ* in column 10 is the effective rate of time preference, given in Eq. (5).  The values of ρ and ρ* are chosen to generate r
f=0.01 in 
Eq. (7).  r
e in column 11 is the overall expected rate of return on unlevered equity (from Eq. [6]). 
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Table 13  Simulated Model based on GDP Disasters (r
f=0.01 in all cases) 





p  π Eb  E(1-b)
-γ E(1-b)
1-γ ρ  ρ* r
e 
baseline (b≥0.10, γ=3.5)  148 516  0.0370 0.287 0.208  4.09  2.33  0.054 0.039  0.069
γ=3.0  148 516  0.0370 0.287 0.208  3.02  1.88  0.033 0.012  0.046
OECD  75 263  0.0287 0.285 0.221  4.96  2.60  0.057 0.039  0.073
non-OECD  73 253  0.0527 0.289 0.196  3.19  2.06  0.046 0.040  0.060
b≥0.15  83 317  0.0198 0.262 0.277  6.06  3.08  0.049 0.025  0.065
b≥0.20  54 228  0.0126 0.237 0.336  8.29  3.89  0.047 0.017  0.063
b≥0.30  23 109  0.0052 0.211 0.459  15.82  6.39  0.042 0.002  0.058
b≥0.40  14 69  0.0032 0.203 0.532  23.13  8.63  0.039 -0.005 0.055
non-war  111 371  0.0268 0.299 0.168  2.02  1.63  0.005 -0.048 0.017
non-war, γ=9  111 371  0.0268 0.299 0.168  7.76  5.92  0.041 -0.017 0.059
HP-filtered  68 433  0.0179 0.157 0.226  4.14  2.44  0.024 -0.019 0.038




Note:  The baseline simulation uses the 148 GDP disasters of size b≥0.10 for the 35 included countries from Table 8.  See the notes to 
Table 12 for discussion and definitions.  
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Table 14  Simulated Model Using Stock-Price Changes during Crises 
 C-crises  GDP-crises 








N: number of observations  51 39 71 55 
γ: coefficient of relative risk aversion  3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
ρ*: effective time-preference rate 
  (Eq. [5]) 
0.030 0.030 0.039 0.039 
g:  normal growth rate  0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 
(1+g)
-γ  0.917 0.917 0.917 0.917 
p: disaster probability  0.0355 0.0355 0.0368 0.0368 
Eb: mean contraction size  0.224 0.210 0.201 0.203 
Stock-returns:      
  E(Rt–1): overall mean (Table 5)  0.0829 0.0829 0.0829 0.0829 
  E(Rt–1): mean in crisis sample  -0.0797 -0.3337 -0.1689 -0.3747 
  E(Rt–1): implied non-crisis mean*  0.0889 0.0982 0.0925 0.1004 
  E[Rt·(1-b)
-γ]: mean in crisis sample  3.574 1.970 3.577 3.246 
Model simulation:      
  E(Rt–1): implied non-crisis**  0.033 0.092 0.039 0.052 
  E(Rt–1): implied overall mean*  0.029 0.077 0.031 0.036 
 
 
*Based on the formula: 
 
 E(Rt) = p·(ERt)|crisis + (1-p)·(ERt)|non-crisis 
 
**Based on approximate formula derived from Eqs. (2)-(4) (neglecting the effects from 
normal fluctuations, σ): 
 
 1+ρ* ≈ (1+g)
-γ·{p· E[Rt·(1-b)
-γ]|crisis + (1-p)·(ERt)|non-crisis} 
 
Note:  The parameters γ, ρ*, g, and p come from Tables 12 and 13.  Stock-price changes 
during crises are in Tables 6 and 8.  The four crisis samples used are C-crises with data 
on stock-price changes (N=51), C-crises with stock-price decreases (N=39), GDP-crises 
with data on stock-price changes (N=71), and GDP-crises with stock-price decreases 
(N=55).  For each of these samples, Eb is the mean of the fractional contraction size, b, 
for C or GDP; E[(1-b)
-γ] is the mean of (1-b)
-γ; and E[(1-b)
1-γ] is the mean of (1-b)
1-γ.  
“E(Rt–1): mean in crisis sample” is the mean for each crisis sample of the fractional 
change in real stock prices.  “E[Rt·(1-b)
-γ]: mean in crisis sample” is the mean for each 
crisis sample of the interaction between (1+fractional change in real stock prices) and 
(1-b)
-γ. 
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Table 15  Bill Returns and Inflation Rates during Crises 
C crises 
  mean median 
Real rate of return on bills (N=53)  -0.060 -0.029 
Inflation rate (N=81)  1.18 0.059 
GDP crises 
Real rate of return on bills (N=69)  -0.057 -0.031 




Note:  The results apply to the crisis samples used in the main analysis:  87 C crises from 
Table 6 and 148 GDP crises from Table 8.  Data for real rates of return on bills and 
inflation rates are for the sub- samples that also have data on bill returns or inflation rates, 
as indicated in Tables 6 and 8.  The cells show means and medians of real rates of return 
on bills and inflation rates for these sub-samples.  74
 
 
Figure 1  C-Disaster Sizes and Durations (Years) 
 
Note:  Histograms show distributions of consumption disaster sizes (fractional declines)  
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Figure 2  GDP-Disaster Sizes and Durations (Years) 
 
Note:  The histograms show distributions of GDP disaster sizes (fractional declines) and 
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Stock-Price Decreases during Disasters 
 
(horizontal axes show fractional declines in real value) 
 
 
Note:  The sample for consumption, C, disasters is the 51 of 87 cases from Table 6 with 
data on stock-price declines.  The sample for GDP disasters is the 71 of 148 cases from 
Table 8 with data on stock-price declines.  We exclude cases in which missing data cause 
the period for stock-price changes to deviate from that for the declines in C or GDP.  A 
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Appendix I 
 
Main differences between Maddison’s GDP Data and our GDP data 
 
  Focus 
Period: 
In Maddison 
(updated version):  Our approach: 
Argentina  Late 19th C. 
[1870-1900] 
Benchmark values provided 
only for 1870 and 1890; 
apparently calculated by 
assuming same growth rates as 
in 1900-1913. 
Used various sources, including recently 
published series based on sectoral output for 
earlier decades (including agriculture, mining, 
manufacturing, energy, construction, trade, 
transports, and services).  Sufficient coverage 
allows starting the series in 1875. 
Austria  WWII 
[1944-1946] 
Indicated source does not 
contain figure for 1945; 
estimation procedure is 
undisclosed. 
Estimated growth rates for the years 1944-1946 
using a weighted average of indexes of 
industrial production and livestock production 
(as proxy for the agricultural sector); estimates 
were constrained to fit the growth rate between 
benchmark values provided in the original 
source. 
   19th-20th C.  Adjusted the series to present 
day boundaries of Austria. 
Followed the criterion explained in the main 
text for territorial adjustment; output measures 
corresponding to the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
were used up to 1918 and to Austria from then 
onwards. 
Brazil  19th-20th C. 
[1850-1890] 
Presents a linear trend for 
1870-1890 (divergence with 
respect to source is 
unexplained). Missing 1851-
1869. 
Constructed a continuous series starting in 1850 
combining various sources, among them the 
most recent revision of Brazilian GDP for the 
20th Century that is currently available and 
which differs from the earlier estimates used in 
Maddison's series. 
Belgium  WWI 
[1914-1919] 
Assumed to move as in 
France. 
Estimated based on the weighted movement in 
production of carbon, cast iron, steel, and 
proxies for agricultural output in the form of 
available cattle and imported malt for 
breweries. Trends were matched with 
productivity data in the carbon industry, 
number of metallurgical facilities in operation, 
and unemployment figures. 
   WWII 
[1939-1947] 
Assumed to move as in 
France. 
Estimated based on benchmark values 
constructed using data on industrial activity 
indexes, the production of carbon, steel and 
electricity, in combination with transports data. 
When industrial data were missing, information 
on railroads, vehicles, merchandise and 
travelers transports, among other 
communications indicators, were weighted to 
connect benchmark values. 
Colombia  [1901-1912] Interpolated with average 
movement in Brazil and Chile. 
Used actual GDP estimates for Colombia 
starting from 1905 and constructed from the 
production side. 
Denmark  19th-20th C.  Starts 1820; territorial 
adjustment to eliminate impact 
of North Schleswig. 
Chose a different combination of sources 
(series starts in 1818). Territorial adjustment to 







(updated version):  Our approach: 
France  19th-20th C. 
(WWI & 
WWII) 
Interpolated between 1913 and 
1920 based on figures of 
industrial and agricultural 
output (assuming services 
remained stable). Interpolated 
1938-1949 using information 
from a separate report on 
national income. 
A different set of sources was chosen to have 
GDP measures be consistent with the Private 
Consumption series that would be built in 
parallel.  More recent and revised measures of 
the evolution of output during WWI and WWII 
were preferred. These are refinements of the 
official series produced by the French Institute of 
Statistics and Economics. 
Germany  WWII 
[1944-1946] 
Assumed 1945 lay midway 
between 1944 and 1946; figures 
for these two years were linked 
from originally unconnected 
sources. 
Used level-comparable anchor values for 1944 
and 1946. Estimated changes for 1945 and 1946 
based on recently published data on industrial 
production for West and East Germany, in 
combination with data on agricultural output 
(crops and livestock). 
   19th-20th C.  Baseline series is adjusted to fit 
borders in three points in time. 
Followed the criterion explained in the main text 
for territorial adjustment, i.e. smooth pasting of 
per capita growth rates during transition years of 
separation and unification. 
Greece  19th-20th C. 
[1914-1920] 
Five benchmark values are 
given for 1820-1921 (missing 
1914-1920). Apparently, as in 
an older but continuous version 
of Maddison's series, these 
benchmarks are assumed to 
follow the aggregate for Eastern 
Europe.  
Used a continuous and longer time series based 
on new estimates developed by a group of 
researchers from the Centre for Planning and 
Economic Research together with the Historical 
Archives of the National Bank of Greece, based 
on output in primary, secondary, and tertiary 
activities, sectoral weights, price deflators and 
measures of money supply. 
   WWII 
[1938-1950] 
Mismatch with indicated source, 
which seems to contain only 
benchmark values for 1938 and 
1947; estimation for the years in 
between is undisclosed.  
Estimated the evolution between the two 
benchmark years by appropriately weighting 
data on industrial production and agricultural 
production (including crops and animals), which 
were calibrated to match the observed evolution 
of aggregate GDP during overlapping years. 
Absolute lack of data does not allow building an 
estimate for 1944. 
Iceland  19th-20th C.  Not considered separately, but 
as part of an aggregate of 
countries whose pre-1950 
growth rates are assumed to 
equal the averages of larger 
Western European countries. 
Considered as a separate country; combined 
sources to construct a continuous series starting 
in 1870. 
India  19th C.  Presents continuous series 
starting in 1884. 
Constructed a different series combining various 
sources that allow starting in 1872. 
Indonesia  WWII 
[1942-1948] 
Missing figures.  Built estimates following an indicators approach 
based on weighted movements in the following 
sectors:  food and crops, mining, construction 
and housing, trade and services, public 
administration, oil and gas. Estimates were 
constrained to match actual GDP growth rates 
for surrounding years. 






(updated version):  Our approach: 
Italy  19th-20th C.  Used previous estimates 
based on older official 
statistical series. 
Constructed a series with the same starting date but a 
different combination of sources, some of which are 
recent revisions of the older statistical figures used 
in Maddison's series and are supported in richer 
estimates of industry, agriculture, and services. 
Japan  WWII 
[1945] 
Apparently, 1945 value was 
assumed to be half of 1944.  
Used the more recent consensus figures displaying a 
decline in output of approximately 50% spread over 
both 1945 and 1946. 
Malaysia  20th C.  Presents series starting in 
1911.  Missing 1943-1946. 
Territorial adjustment to fit 
figures to present day 
Malaysia. 
Extended the series to 1900 using recently published 
revisions of older series corresponding to Malaya. 
Mexico  Revolution 
[1911-1920] 
Used linear interpolation as 
done in another source. 
[Forthcoming] Estimated based on sectoral shares 
and output from oil, mining , sugar, breweries, steel, 
textiles, sisal, transports, electricity, other 
manufacturing, various harvests, and trade data. 
(Maddison's population series is also a linear 
interpolation between 1910 and 1920, which yields 
incorrect measures of per capita output; a separate 
population series was built from historical records.) 
   [1896-1899]  Missing.  Covered with official figures of GDP. 
Netherlands  19th-20th C. 
(WWI & 
WWII) 
Started continuous series in 
1820; covered World War 
years with undisclosed 
aggregate measures. 
A new series was constructed with the purpose of 
extending the series further back into the past, being 
explicit about proxies used as measures of GDP, and 
taking advantage of new revisions to older series.  In 
particular, deflated measures of Gross Domestic 
Income were used to extend the series to the early 
years of the 19th Century.  In the absence of a GDP 
aggregate, WWI and WWII years were covered with 
figures corresponding to Net National Product. 
Singapore  Early 20th 
C. 
Continuous series starts in 
1950.  Benchmark for 1913 
is provided, apparently from 
the assumption that per 
capita GDP moved 
proportionately to that of 
Malaysia. 
Used newly generated series of GDP starting in 1900 
(but missing the period 1940-1949), based on the 
estimation of all demand side components of GDP. 
South Africa  20th C.  Presents data starting in 
1950. 











(updated version):  Our approach: 
South Korea  War periods  
[1941-1953] 
Mismatch with indicated 
sources, undisclosed 
estimation procedure. 
Estimated real growth rates for most of the period by 
weighting movements in agricultural production, 
commodities production, and provision of services. 
In some cases, explicit assumptions were made due 
to lack of continuous data points.  An aggregate 
measure of GDP was built for the last four years 
with information reported by international 
organizations during the Korean War. 
Sweden  19th-20th C.  Source from an older study; 
series starts in 1820. 
Extended the series to 1800 using recently published 
figures compatible with revised official data and 
covering the two centuries. 
Switzerland  WWI-1920's 
[1914-1929] 
Uses a baseline source that 
proxies output with moving 
averages of railroad 
transport volume for 1914-
1924 (combined with 
industrial production for 
1925-1929). Adjustments to 
match movements in 
another source are not 
detailed. 
Re-estimated GDP figures for this period following 
an indicators approach using a wider set of variables: 
private consumption (in turn estimated for 1851-
1948 from quantities of consumption items and 
expenditure shares), expenditures of the 
confederation, exports, imports, freight traffic on 
railways, gross consumption of energy, industrial 
production, number of new residences, number of 
stock companies and capital at year end of stock 
companies. Whenever necessary, a CPI (built for 
purposes of the Private Consumption series) was 
used as deflator. 
   19th-20th C.  Not fully explained 
adjustments based on a 
combination of sources. 
Preferred to construct a new series accounting for 
specific details.  For example, the use of an actual 
GDP deflator, which is available for the earlier part 
of the series starting in 1851, and the use of Net 
National Product to cover the lack of a GDP measure 
during 1930-1948. 
Taiwan  War periods 
[1939-1949] 
Covered 1939-1945 with 
older estimates and 1945-
1949 by assuming equal 
percentage growth for each 
of these years. 
Used recently published series based on revised 
national accounts statistics for the 20th Century. 
This new source presents constant price series based 
on different deflating methods, all of which show 
different patterns compared to older estimates. 
U.K.  19th-20th C.  Used various sources; made 
assumptions related to 
territorial adjustments to 
present day boundaries. 
Although patterns do not change markedly, we chose 
a different concatenation of sources.  Some of these 
are themselves "compromise" series of earlier 
estimates; official sources for post-WWII data. 
U.S.  19th C.  Provides five benchmark 
figures for 1820-1870. 
Continuous series starting in 1790 taken from a new 
edition of the Historical Statistics of the U.S.  This 
series is modified to incorporate our preferred 
estimates for certain periods and to exclude the Civil 
War years, which warrant further analysis. 
Venezuela  19th C. 
[1884-1899] 
Discarded data from the 
source for pre-1900 
decades. 
Started the series in 1884 using GDP estimates based 
on a wide coverage of sectors, including agriculture, 
commerce and finances, government, and transports. 




Graphs of Long-Term per capita GDP and Consumer Expenditure, C 
 
Note:  All graphs use a natural-log scale, ranging from 5.5 ($245 in 2000 U.S. dollars) to 
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Appendix III 
 
Disasters Gauged by (one-sided) HP-Filtered C and GDP 
 
 
Table A1  Consumption Disasters (one-sided HP filters) 
Part 1:  OECD Countries 
Country Trough  Peak  C  decline 
Australia  1920 1913  0.202 
  1935 1928  0.167 
 1945  1938 0.215 
Belgium 1944  1938 0.505 
Canada  1923 1913  0.166 
  1935 1930  0.136 
Denmark 1943  1939 0.202 
Finland 1919  1913 0.201 
  1933 1929  0.105 
 1944  1939 0.181 
France  1874 1864  0.104 
 1918  1913 0.185 
 1944  1934 0.530 
Germany 1920  1913 0.384 
 1947  1940 0.356 
Iceland (X)  1995 1988  0.096 
Italy 1946  1940 0.221 
Japan 1936  1928 0.123 
 1946  1937 0.515 
Netherlands 1919  1913 0.264 
 1944  1934 0.487 
Norway  none 
Portugal  none 
Spain 1939  1929 0.416 
Sweden  1945 1940  0.106 
Switzerland  1945 1940  0.142 
U.K. 1918  1915 0.109 
 1944  1939 0.160 
U.S.  1934 1929  0.136 
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Part 2:  Non-OECD Countries 
Country Trough  Peak  C  decline 
Argentina  1933 1929  0.141 
  1990 1980  0.168 
  2004 2000  0.149 
Brazil  1992 1985  0.158 
Chile  1917 1913  0.198 
  1933 1930  0.247 
 1978  1973 0.320 
  1987 1981  0.157 
Colombia (X)  1945 1941  0.095 
India (X)  1942  1933 0.184 
Malaysia (X)  1922 1917  0.297 
  1934 1930  0.141 
Mexico (X)  1933 1929  0.188 
  1988 1982  0.115 
Peru  1914 1909  0.095 
  1985 1976  0.205 
  1993 1988  0.229 
Singapore (X)  1916 1910  0.103 
Taiwan 1947  1937 0.578 
Turkey (X)  1946 1940  0.222 
Uruguay (X)  1985 1981  0.189 
  2004 2000  0.134 
Venezuela (X)  1933 1930  0.499 
  1971 1961  0.148 
 1990  1982  0.331 
 
 
Note:  C declines (0.1 or greater) are cumulative fractions from peak year to trough year.  
Bold indicates current participant in external or internal war.  X denotes not in C sample.   89
 
Table A2  GDP Disasters (one-sided HP filters) 
Part 1:  OECD Countries 
Country Trough  Peak  GDP  decline 
Australia  1897 1891  0.255 
  1920 1913  0.109 
  1933 1928  0.163 
Austria 1920  1913 0.346 
  1936 1930  0.226 
 1947  1943 0.455 
Belgium 1919  1913 0.436 
  1935 1930  0.108 
 1945  1938 0.426 
Canada  1922 1917  0.191 
  1935 1930  0.250 
Denmark 1943  1939 0.165 
Finland 1919  1914 0.225 
France 1919  1913 0.208 
  1938 1930  0.180 
 1945  1939 0.310 
Germany 1920  1913 0.321 
  1933 1929  0.172 
 1949  1944 0.663 
Greece  1872 1862  0.200 
 1898  1888 0.174 
 1917  1912 0.260 
 1945  1939 0.626 
Iceland  1921 1915  0.189 
Italy 1946  1940 0.267 
Japan 1949  1943 0.439 
Netherlands 1919  1914 0.174 
  1935 1930  0.128 
 1945  1939 0.426 
New Zealand  1888 1879  0.116 
  1933 1925  0.125 
Norway 1945  1939 0.115 
Portugal  none 
Spain 1939  1930 0.316 
Sweden  1921 1916  0.131 
Switzerland  1883 1876  0.110 
  1919 1912  0.132 
  1944 1934  0.127 
U.K.  1923 1918  0.143 
  1949 1944  0.109 
U.S.  1934 1929  0.221 
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Part 2:  Non-OECD Countries 
Country Trough  Peak  GDP  decline 
Argentina  1918 1912  0.248 
  1934 1929  0.135 
  1990 1980  0.201 
  2003 1999  0.113 
Brazil  1900 1891  0.175 
Chile  1933 1930  0.201 
 1977  1972 0.170 
India 1950  1943 0.103 
Indonesia 1947  1941 0.517 
Malaysia (X)  1941 1931  0.184 
Mexico (X)  1915?  1910 0.106? 
  1934 1926  0.252 
Peru  1933 1929  0.137 
  1985 1976  0.142 
  1993 1987  0.269 
Philippines  1988 1983  0.171 
Singapore (X)  1916 1911  0.212 
  1928 1925  0.153 
  1932 1930  0.178 
South Africa  1994 1984  0.156 
South Korea  1952  1942 0.486 
Sri Lanka  1923 1914  0.107 
Taiwan 1947  1938 0.594 
Turkey (X)  1945 1940  0.276 
Uruguay  1901 1896  0.112 
  1917 1913  0.176 
  1935 1930  0.210 
  1967 1957  0.169 
  1986 1981  0.171 
  2003 2000  0.105 
Venezuela  1901 1895  0.109 
  1963 1958  0.101 
 1989  1979  0.298 
 2003  1993  0.157 
 
 
Note:  GDP declines (0.1 or greater) are cumulative fractions from peak year to trough year.  
Bold indicates current participant in external or internal war.  X denotes not in GDP sample.   91
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